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ABSTRACT
Much of the current retail real estate development in the
People's Republic of China (PRC) is concentrated in the
Special Economic Zones, which are areas where China has been
experimenting with capitalism. This development is primarily
from foreign investment encouraged by the economic reforms of
Deng Xiaopeng. Until recently, mainland cities such as
Beijing, the capital of the PRC, have been overlooked. With
the current reform movement escalating, there are many
opportunities to develop retail projects in this city given
its favorable demographic trends.
Choosing a prime location in Beijing is only one of a number
of important factors to consider. Developers should be aware
of urban development transitions, retail development patterns
and demographic changes. They should also be knowledgeable of
the local urban planning process, real estate development
procedures, local customs and laws, and development entity
options.
In this thesis, a basic framework is presented to determine
the potential real estate development opportunities for retail
uses in Beijing. Although specific sites for prospective
retail projects are not offered, key information is set forth
to provide a foundation for further research.
Thesis Supervisor: Gary Hack
Title: Professor of Urban Design
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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There are numerous real estate development opportunities in
The People's Republic of China (PRC), the world's third
largest country (behind the former Soviet Union and Canada)
and home to almost one out of every four people in the world.'
Because of the economic reforms instituted by Deng Xiaopeng in
1978, this "sleeping giant" is beginning to emerge as an
economic powerhouse, with people benefitting from the
country's prosperity with higher income and greater spending
capacity.
Economic reform has also provided gains to urban cities such
as Beijing, which has seen an increase in population during
the last ten years, a higher standard of living for its
residents and a need for well-conceived retail projects in
strategic locations within the city. There have only been a
few foreign joint venture retail developments in Mainland
China. Therefore, there are avenues for foreign developers to
successfully exploit retail development opportunities.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the potential real
estate development opportunities for commercial retail uses in
1 Fredric Kaplan, The China Guidebook: 1991-1992, 12th Edition
(Teaneck: Eurasia Press, Inc., 1991), p. 20.
INTRODUCTION
Beijing, the capital of the People's Republic of China. Real
estate development in Beijing is different from the United
States and from other areas of China such as the Special
Economic Zones. Thus, identifying retail opportunities
requires a general understanding of the present PRC:
Demographic trends, local and central political structures,
economic reforms, the real estate development process and
legal structures of development arrangements.
This research is divided into five chapters. The first
contains relevant background information and demographics on
Beijing and China which will assist in understanding retail
trends and consumer spending patterns. The second chapter
covers information on urban development trends, the role of
the government in the formation of Beijing, the key urban
planning issues facing the municipality and the future retail
development patterns. The third chapter discusses the real
estate development process in Beijing, the nature of foreign
investment and the various legal entities available in
structuring foreign real estate developments. The fourth
chapter contains two case studies which will analyze retail
districts from a foreign developer's perspective. The fifth
chapter will finalize the paper by deriving conclusions
regarding the potential real estate development opportunities
in Beijing based on findings from the previous four chapters.
This thesis serves as a general advisory piece for those with
a special interest in conducting future real estate
transactions in Beijing, particularly in the retail sector.
Specific detailed analysis must be performed and professional
advisors should be consulted before considering such a
venture.
I. OVERVIEW AND DEMOGRAPHICS
CHINA
Demographic Factors
Prior to 1978, retail real estate development in China was
basically one of two forms: (1) Small proprietorships owned
by community residents, or (2) Local government-owned
department stores. Foreign investment in the retail arena was
virtually nonexistent. In 1979, the "Open Door" policy was
instituted by Deng Xiaopeng. This program called for
substantial economic reforms and paved the way for retail real
estate development projects funded by foreign capital. This
policy had shown only limited success at the outset since "The
door was open, but it was not completely open".2
In the early 1980's, the two prevalent forms of foreign
investment for retail real estate development, joint and
wholly foreign-owned ventures, were in their embryonic stages
and many of the pre-economic reform restrictions were still in
existence. Joint venture arrangements between the Chinese and
foreign partners were encouraged, but joint venture laws
within China lacked the foundation and structure to be
2 Interview with Associate Professor Mao Qizhi, Architecture
and Urban Planning Department of Tsinghua University in Beijing,
July 11, 1992.
effectively implemented. Wholly foreign-owned enterprises
were ladened with too many restrictions to be attractive to
outside investors, who had* better opportunities in other
countries (United States) with lower political risks.
Currently, the retail real estate development potential in The
People's Republic of China (PRC) is almost unlimited since the
foundation of Joint Venture Laws was strengthened and the many
restrictions for foreign investment were eased.3 As of 1990,
it is estimated that the population of China is 1.143 billion
people or a 1.45% increase over the 1990 population of 1.127
billion people.' Therefore, a gradual growth in income and
spending patterns will likely yield enormous benefits to those
who invest in the retail sector.
There are currently three trends in the urban areas of China
which a retail developer should note:
1. The ratio of urban residents to total population was 26.4%
3 There is a note of caveat regarding the statistics presented
in this papaer. All of the data was compiled by Chinese
statisticians, who are considered by U.S. Embassy officials to be
competent. However, the integrity of the imformation compiled is
questionable. Therefore, the historical data presented should be
evaluated based on the trends that it projects rather than on the
accuracy of the data itself.
4 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991 (Beijing: China Statistical
Information and Consultancy Service Center, 1991), p. 3.
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in 1990, or an 8.5% increase in composition since 1978.5 This
implies that there is an increase in the migration from the
rural areas to the urban areas for jobs, thereby fueling
demand for additional retail space.
2. The percentage of unemployed persons in urban areas has
decreased from 5.3% in 1978 to 2.5% in 1990.6 This beneficial
trend indicates that there is more prosperity in the cities,
thereby absorbing much of the excess capacity of the labor
pool.
3. Newly employed persons in urban areas have increased 44%
from 5.4 million people in 1978 to 7.9 million people in
1990,7 but the composition is substantially derived from
persons of other cities and towns and from graduates of
universities. This trend is very important since most of the
urban growth has come at the expense of other cities. A
retail real estate developer must therefore perform diligent
research on the population and work force movement patterns
before he/she builds in a city.
The 1990 total value of retail sales increased 533% since 1978
5 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991, p. 16.
6 Ibid, p. 20.
7 Ibid, p. 20.
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(from 156 billion to 830 billion yuan, unadjusted for
inflation), with the ratio of consumer good purchases to total
retail sales increasing modestly, from 81% in 1978 to 87% in
1990 (agricultural good sales accounting for the remaining 19%
and 13% respectively). 8 This is further evidence of China's
growing prosperity. In general, the PRC will strive for
double-digit economic growth through the end of the decade.9
An interesting statistic is that urban retail sales as a
proportion of total sales throughout the country have
decreased from 48% in 1978 to 44% in 1990,10 with rural areas
capturing a greater percentage of retail sales. Two
explanations may account for these trends. The first is that
rural incomes have risen much faster than urban earnings. The
rural areas have prospered a great deal more as a result of
the 1978 economic reforms than the urban areas, which have
grown at a slower rate. The second explanation is that there
are more sales to urban residents at rural locations, where
prices are likely to be more inexpensive than city goods. The
above trends are difficult to assess because the lines between
rural and urban areas are hard to ascertain, especially at the
8 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991, p. 99.
9 "China Growth Goal Backs Reformers", International Herald
Tribune, (Paris), July 17, 1992, p. 13.
10 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991, p. 99.
edges of the city.
Political Factors
The post-1949 People's Republic of China was considered to be
a socialist country, where the government owned all land and
no one individual stood above all others within the "great
masses". Within this framework, the retail sector of the
economy was basically subordinate to heavy industry. The
state had owned all of the large retail shops and price
controls were set such that they were uniform across the
country without regard to the costs of manufacturing and
shipping. The quality of products were often poor, inventory
shipments were unreliable and inventory levels were
inconsistent because wages were fixed and no incentives were
built into individual compensation. Service to the ultimate
customer was basically non-existent and retail expenditures
were low. Much of the money not spent was kept in cash
(hidden "mattress" money) and away from government-owned banks
to avoid disclosure.
In the 1980's, backed by Deng Xiaoping's leadership, socialism
was appearing to wane and citizen's rights and democracy were
pledged to be top priorities as China attempted to
continuously modernize. The country's official doctrine was
economic liberalization but maintenance of the political
status quo. "Socialism" was still considered the country's
political stance although in reality this posture was
constantly tested. The prospects for foreign investment in
retail real estate development were promising even though the
primary vehicles (joint venture contracts) to fulfill these
opportunities have yet to be designed.
In June 1989, an effort to institute democracy was dealt a
major setback. At Tian'anmen Square in Beijing, a student-led
protest stemming from the government's apparent lack of speed
in instituting economic and social reform was abruptly and
bloodily dismantled by government troops. Consequently,
foreign investment in China had virtually halted. In the
U.S., China was temporarily removed from the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status, a designation given to countries who are
able to trade with the U.S. on its best terms.
In the few years since the Tian'anmen Square incident, foreign
countries again have been placing money into China with
contracts (not all real estate) through May 1992 amounting to
$10.45 billion, or 2.7 times the amount for the corresponding
period in 1991.11 In the U.S., China again has been
reinstated as a Most Favored Nation even though its human
rights issues remained. Real estate investments in the PRC
have noticeably increased although little, if any real estate
11 David Holley, "China's Reformers Are Back on the offensive",
Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1992, p. A22.
involvement from the U.S. has occurred since the student
uprising. American companies will be forced to become
involved as scarce development opportunities exist
domestically and as retail development opportunities in China
are capitalized by other foreign firms.
Political Hierarchy under the Central Government
China is divided into three administrative levels:
(1) Province (includes autonomous regions and three specified
municipalities directly under the Central Government dominion)
(2) County (consists of cities, banners, special districts,
industrial-agricultural districts and forest districts)
(3) Township (comprised of towns)
In the first stratum, there are 23 provinces, 5 autonomous
regions, and three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai and
Tianjin) directly under the Central Government. In the second
and third levels of hierarchy, there are thousands of counties
and townships. 12
At the micro level within a city, there are two additional
12 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991, p. 2.
levels of hierarchy that are important for a developer to
know: (1) District Area Level, which is concerned with the
development of the local community fabric and (2) "Street"
Government, which is involved with issues within specific
street neighborhoods.
Economic Considerations
Economic and Agricultural Reforms
Prior to the economic reforms in 1978, the PRC had centrally
planned China's economy through careful strategy and
controlled growth. This system involved agricultural quota
targets and state-directed resource allocation which had
stunted change and suppressed worker incentives.
Under Deng Xiaoping's guidance, the PRC in 1978 decentralized
control to farmers and private enterprise. Initially, the
economic reforms appeared to have little ostensible effect on
China's urban economy, which relied predominantly on industry
(see Beijing's economic categorization in Exhibit A),
government-owned businesses and to a lesser extent private
enterprise.
Even today, China heavily relies on industry as the leader of
its civic economies. Large government monopolies still exist
in raw materials such as iron, steel, petroleum and coal and
in energy/untilities (e.g. electricity). In addition, the
Central Government owns the major banks. There are presently
no plans to dismantle these controlled sectors, which account
for most of the urban employment within cities.
Much of transformation of enterprises from the economic reform
movement has been in the small segments of China's economy,
the rural regions. The prosperity of these sections,
especially at the edge of the cities, have permeated the urban
areas. The decentralization policy created a "responsibility
system" which allowed farmers to sell excess agricultural
production over the minimum government quota at the free
market prices (i.e. without government-controlled rates). The
farmers became more affluent with this motivation to make
economically-based business decisions. They started their
own businesses and built their own factories. As of June
1992, there were more than 20 million rural enterprises in
China and 129 of them had an annual output of more than 100
million yuan ($18 U.S. million) each. Additionally, the total
number of employed workers in rural enterprises exceeded 100
million. 13  Thus, the sharp delineation between urban and
rural areas became blurred and the need for retail services
and development was emerging, specifically along the perimeter
"rural" areas of cities such as Beijing.
13 "Flexibility is key for rural enterprises to develop
faster", China Daily, (Beijing), June 30, 1992, p. 4.
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Demand for Better Customer Service
The small but powerful advent of the private economy had other
beneficial effects. First, wages offered to workers in the
private sector were much higher (as much as 10 times greater)
than those employed in government-owned businesses. In
addition, private companies only hired and kept the best
workers as employees. Those receiving higher wages were
therefore able to enjoy the advantages of additional consumer
spending.
Another benefit was product quality. Consumer goods made in
the private sector were higher in quality although more
expensive to produce due to higher labor costs. Third, with
better products came the expectation of superior service and
a clean environment. Interviews with various shoppers at the
Longfusi Temple Market District and the Lufthansa Center in
Beijing revealed that customers preferred shopping in
department stores or small shops that not only enhanced the
shopping experience but also provided superior service.
Prices may be higher in those stores but in many cases costs
were considered secondary issues. This consumer attitude may
explain why retail franchises such as Kentucky Fried Chicken
are successful in China. "The Chinese people are poor, but if
they receive better service, they are not as price sensitive
as one may imagine".14
' The consequences of the above on retail real estate
development are important. If retail development is to be
successful, not only is location important but also the
selection of tenants who are willing to commit themselves to
selling quality products and providing excellent service.
Special Economic Zones and Coastal Port Cities
In 1984, the PRC government established 4 special economic
zones to experiment with capitalism. They were: Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shantou. In 1988, the Hainan Island was
added to the list, bring the total to 5 SEZ's. In theory, the
zones were established to: (1) promote local prosperity, (2)
generate foreign exchange and (3) serve as experimental
grounds for new managerial and economic systems. This also
was a learning framework for administrators from other parts
of China to study methods of international business. Foreign
investors, particularly those from Hong Kong and Macao, poured
in millions of dollars to build factories and to develop real
estate. As a result, these zones experienced remarkable
success.
From a retail real estate development standpoint, the
14 Interview with Tsinghua Associate Professor Mao Qizhi, July
11, 1992.
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prosperity of the economic zones has resulted in increased
consumer spending and opportunities to service the growing
~ sectors of business and housing. However, many retail
developments were built too quickly and were poor in
quality. 15 In addition, high vacancy rates and an overbuilt
retail market may become a problem since many of these
projects were speculative in nature (i.e. built without
securing tenants). Shenzhen is currently experiencing this
situation in some of its new shopping areas.16
In addition to the 5 special zones, there were 14 designated
cities which were given some of the special policies granted
to the SEZ's. Some examples include: (1) simplified
procedures for foreign businessmen entering or leaving China,
(2) the ability to establish exclusive foreign investment
operations and (3) time limit extension for the duration of
China-foreign joint ventures. In these coastal areas the
local governments' powers were also expanded. The impact on
retail development is unknown due to limited economic freedom
in these areas. Nevertheless, as China continues to
accelerate its efforts to modernize, these port cities are
15 Most buildings are designed to last 20 years but they
effectively age quicker than their expected lives because of poor
construction materials and the lack of maintenance. Source:
Interview with Professor Zhu Zixuan, Architecture and Urban
Planning Department of Tsinghua University in Beijing, July 14,
1992.
16 Interview with Tsinghua Associate Professor Mao Qizhi, July
11, 1992.
expected to gain the same rights and privileges as the SEZ's
and will likely experience similar success.
Foreign Investment and the open Door Policy
Under Deng Xiaopeng's leadership, commercial laws and tax
codes were modified to encourage foreign investment into the
People's Republic of China. However, this did not happen as
quickly many had hoped. As mentioned previously, "The door
was open, but not completely open".17
Despite its slow reaction in allowing other countries to
partake in China's economic reform, the PRC has repeatedly
emphasized its stance and continuance of the "Open Door"
policy that had been in effect since 1978. As evidence of
this, Shanghai in 1990 had (1) opened the Pudong Redevelopment
Area to foreign investment, (2) established the Shanghai
Securities Exchange, and (3) approved selected foreign banks
to open branches in 1991.
Furthermore, the government's long-term view of the real
estate industry is one of great importance to the China
economy. It is widely believed that foreign investment, which
drives the real estate market, will help provide a solution to
the country's cash shortage problem as well as create
17 Interview with Tsinghua Associate Professor Mao Qizhi, July
11, 1992.
additional employment. Furthermore, foreign capital in real
estate joint venture developments is also expected assist in
China's drastic reformation of the urban housing process, a
40-year system of subsidized housing which had placed a heavy
burden on the country's budget.
Investor Concerns
In spite of the above and the high level of foreign real
estate investment through the first five months in 1992, most
observers believe that foreign development companies,
particularly those in the U.S., are awaiting fundamental
changes in China's economic system (tariff and import tax
removal) before the "true" flood of investment into the
country will come to fruition. Additionally, there are
lingering concerns about China's political and social course
(human rights) following the Tian'anmen Square incident.
There are further concerns regarding China's economic reforms
if 88-year old Deng Xiaopeng dies before the movement is
complete. The economic and political risks in real estate
development are compounded in the retail sector. An anchor
tenant is needed to secure financing but is difficult to
attract (other than a department store owned by the local
Chinese government) because of Chinese trade restrictions and
import taxes imposed on foreign retail establishments.
Finally, determining the appropriate rate of return to foreign
investors is a problem since few transactions have been
consummated and pricing political risk requires subjective
judgement.
Development Barriers
There are Chinese barriers which further discourage foreign
investment in China. These obstacles are categorized into 3
areas: Import barriers, Service barriers and Investment
barriers.
Import barriers are obstructions the Central Government places
on foreign investors to neutralize their effect on existing
domestic businesses. The most common import barriers relating
to foreign real estate development are tariffs and other
import charges on raw materials used for construction. To a
large extent state planning and price controls on government-
controlled materials have reduced the effect of tariffs and
other charges but their impacts (3 to 200%)18 on certain raw
goods may be significant.
Service barriers are hurdles that foreign service industry
professionals (lawyers, accountants, insurance carriers)
encounter which place them at a competitive disadvantage when
bidding against similar Chinese professionals. This is of
particular importance to foreign developers who need
18 USC International Business Education & Research (IBEAR)
Program, "5th Annual Asia/Pacific Business Outlook", (unpublished
seminar materials, March 16, 1992), p. 60.
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consultants with real estate expertise to evaluate the markets
and economic prospects of a specific site. Relying on
indigenous firms can be dangerous if real estate knowledge and
technical expertise are lacking and if secondary research
information is solely used to make decisions. Some progress
has been made in allowing foreign service firms to operate
(e.g. Chinese insurance monopoly and restricted charters on
air transport) but none of these changes relate to real
estate.
Investment barriers are limitations which discourage capital
infusions by potential investors since they limit the ability
of capital markets to fully function. The ones relevant to
retail real estate are:
1) Foreign currency regulations - These laws limit the
convertibility of domestic currency (RMB) into foreign
exchange and have a direct impact on real estate
investments in China. This probably is the most critical
factor influencing the decision to invest in retail real
estate development. 1 9  If investors can not repatriate
profits back to their domicile countries, there is no
19 The Reminbi (RMB), called the "People's Money", is not
convertible into foreign exchange and is therefore devalued in the
"unofficial" foreign exchange process (black market). Its value
therefore fluctuates according to demand. As of July 1992, the
black market rate was approximately 6 yuan (RMB) to $1 U.S. dollar,
or 10% above the official exchange rate of 5.4 yuan (FEC) to $1
U.S. dollar.
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incentive to invest in China. The foreign currency
exchange problem is discussed in the below Profit
Repatriation Issue section.
2) Interregional barriers - Local economies have proprietary
interest by provincial governments which bar imports from
other regions of China. This may effect those retail
tenants that need to ship inventory at multiple locations
throughout China.
3) Access to raw materials - The recentralization of the raw
material supply source limits the alternatives available
to foreign companies in need of such unrefined goods.
This limitation hurts retail real estate development
since certain raw materials produced in China may be in
short or restricted supply, thereby requiring the
shipment of those needed materials from other countries.
The cost of construction will likely increase due to high
delivery costs, tariffs and other import charges.
4) Dispute resolution - Formal resolution over outstanding
problems may be performed through a government agency or
a foreign organization, whose ultimate decision may not
be recognized by the Chinese government (see below
Dispute Resolution section).
Foreign Investment Issues
There are two basic problems that the Chinese government must
solve before international investment in real estate
development accelerates: (1) Perception on China's stability
and (2) Imperfect land lease pricing. First, many foreign
real estate contracts have been signed but some of the
registered foreign funds have not come to China as promised.
For example, in the Special Economic Zone of Xiamen, only 20%
of the registered foreign funds have placed the capital that
they had promised. 20 Some effort must be made by the local
government to determine why the actual flow of capital is not
entering the Chinese domain and if possible, to placate
foreign company reservations.
Secondly, there is no independent pricing mechanism for land
use rights. A retail developer's concern is that the land
lease rates charged by a municipality may be too high if a
market-determined pricing system does not exist. Local
governments in limited areas have responded to these issues by
discounting such land use rights to very low rates (sometimes
below market). Retail developers who are capable of
determining market values for sites will therefore be able to
capitalize on the current imperfections of government land
lease pricing.
20 Zhu Ling, "China's land reform takes flight", China Daily:
Business Weekly, (Beijing), June 28-July 4, 1992, p. 1.
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The local government's land pricing system is currently
described as follows: Small amounts of area are originally
' offered at ridiculously low lease rates to determine market
value. For example, land in Shenzhen was initially priced at
one yuan per one square meter for the full 50-year term.
Because the amount of land rights sold at this price is small,
the government loses little money and the expectation is that
this "giveaway" rate will eventually adjust to market forces.
In the Shenzhen case, land lease rights for comparable land
currently cost approximately 1,500 yuan per square meter for
the same 50-year term. 21  However, this rate may still be
below the true market value since it was set by the local
government.
The municipality's justification for these actions is that
selling land rights cheaply is a small price to pay for
attracting the enormous business potential that foreign
developments will provide for the local economy. This tactic
has resulted in similar action by other cities and provinces,
which have escalated this price cutting competition by
undercutting each other to attract foreign ventures.
Municipalities are currently considering an auction or a land
price bidding system to ascertain "true" market value but the
implementation process has yet to be devised. Therefore,
21 Interview with Tsinghua Associate Professor Mao Qizhi, July
11, 1992.
retail developers should quickly find these underpriced areas
and exploit these opportunities before a solution is found.
Revamping the Foreign Commercial Code
The PRC instituted the following legal modifications to its
current commercial code to further encourage real estate
development and to re-emphasize its stance on the "Open Door"
policy. Although they fall well short of a bilateral
investment treaty, they are an improvement from prior years.
April 1990 Commercial Code Amendments
1) A foreigner could sit as Chairman of the Board on an
equity joint venture. This allows more flexibility in
forming the management structure. Previously, foreign
firms hesitated from establishing a partnership since
they did not want to risk losing control over their
venture with a mandatory Chinese chairman in place.
2) Certain kinds of equity joint ventures could be
established without explicit time limits. Real estate
development ventures do not generally fall within this
category. Nevertheless, the maximum term of 30 years may
be extended to 50 years if the investment is large or if
the construction period is long and the return on
investment is low. 22
3) There are assurances against nationalization, except
under special circumstances. These special situations
are not business in nature but involve actions by a joint
venture which may pose a threat to the security of the
PRC or are contrary to the country's national interest.
Tax Law Changes
1) The preferential tax treatment accorded real estate
equity joint ventures will be conferred to wholly
foreign-owned real estate enterprises and contractual
joint ventures. As discussed in the below Wholly
Foreign-Owned Enterprises section, a unified tax system
is expected and will eliminate the differences between
the two types of entities.
2) Income tax rates for certain types of companies are
decreased from a maximum of 55% to 33%. Real estate
joint ventures are now subject to a basic rate of 30%
plus a 10% surtax on taxes paid, or 33%. Newly-
established joint ventures may apply for a 2-year
complete exemption from taxes plus a 3-year add-on at a
22 Arthur Andersen & Co, China Perspectives, 3rd Edition (New
York: Arthur Andersen & Co, May 1989), p. 176.
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50% reduction in income tax rates. 23  A foreign tax
specialist should be consulted to determine the exact
requirements to qualify for these tax abatements.
3) Additional tax preferences are granted for companies
established in the Special Economic Zones or in real
estate projects encouraged by the Central Government.
The types of preferences are not specified but they are
usually deductions or tax credits on project expenditures
made.
BEIJING MUNICIPALITY
Retail Development Outlook
Beijing is the capital of the People's Republic of China and
is a political, cultural and transportation center. It's
population in 1988 was estimated to be 9.88 million, the
majority of which reside within the urban area. 24 There is
sufficient basis to believe that there are opportunities for
profitable retail developments given the large number of
people who reside within the city, the projected increase in
individual incomes from urban prosperity and the growth in
tertiary industries (such as services relating to tourism,
23 Arthur Andersen & Co, Chapter 8.
24 China International Economic Consultants, Inc., The China
Investment Guide, 4th Edition (Hong Kong: Longman Group (Far East)
Ltd., 1989), p. 111.
real estate, law, accounting, consulting).
' Currently, Beijing has areas in need of retail development,
particularly between the Second and Third Ring Roads (See
Exhibit B for City Map) . In the short term, the east portion
of the city (Chaoyang District) will require retail
development to service its concentration of small business,
financial centers and foreign embassies. On the west side of
the city in the research and high technology Xicheng and
Haidian Districts, retail establishments will be essential to
service residential developments housing workers in those
areas. In the central core of the city, there will be
opportunities to redevelop in small pockets but the site
redevelopment restrictions will be much more stringent than
those in the outer periphery of the city.25
In the long term, retail projects similar to the ones
identified on the west side will be needed as development
occurs in the northern edge of the city (near Tsinghua
University) and as redevelopment and residential conversions
begin in the southern end. In general, the areas of
commercial innovation will be predominantly in~ the well-
established neighborhoods and along the perimeters of the
25 Interview with Professor Zhu Zixuan, Architecture and Urban
Planning Department of Tsinghua University in Beijing, July 14,
1992.
city. 26
Retail shops in Beijing essentially fall into four categories:
(1) extremely small (2-4 square meters), (2) small (less than
100 square meters), (3) medium (approximately 5,000 square
meters) and (4) large (30,000 or less square meters). The
extremely small and small retail constitutes the largest
quantity of establishments, roughly 10,000, and ranges from
portable stands which sell food or small goods to occupied
space in buildings which house specialty stores or
restaurants. Although extremely small shops involve little or
no real estate ramifications, small shops consist of sole
proprietors who predominantly own their occupied space. The
medium retail developments number approximately 100 and are
government-owned. Finally, there are 10 large shops which are
substantially government-owned (Longfusi Temple Market
District) or in a joint venture with the local government as
a partner (Beijing Lufthansa Center) .27 Future foreign
ventures in retail development will likely be large in scale
since foreign investors with an abundance of capital will want
to maximize their investments through economies of scale and
to negotiate with local governments from a position of
strength.
26 Interview with Tsinghua Professor Zhu Zixuan, July 14, 1992.
27 Interview with Tsinghua Associate Professor Mao Qizhi, July
11, 1992.
Social Labor Force and Balanced Economy
Beijing's social labor force in 1990 totaled 6.5 million
people, which is second among the three municipalities
controlled by the government 28 but very low compared to the
much larger provinces such as Sichuan and Shandong, which have
58.7 and 41.4 million people, respectively. 29  The 6.5
million labor force is distributed among 13 industry sectors
and is summarized in Exhibit A attached. As shown in the
Exhibit, Beijing as well as the two other province-status
municipalities (Shanghai and Tianjin) have balanced economies
compared to the national total. But Beijing has shown the
highest growth rate out of the three municipalities with an
increase of 5.8% between 1989 and 1990. This implies that
retail development will be needed to service the added labor
force in the coming years.
Wage Statistics and Consumer Spending Patterns
Beijing residents enjoy a relative advantage over 25 other
provinces in terms of wages: it ranks 5th in income per
28 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991, p. 2.
Note: Administratively, Beijing is only one of three cities
(Shanghai and Tianjin are the other two) classified as a
"municipality directly under the Central Government", which is
equivalent to a province. The city also has 8 counties and 10
districts.
29 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistical Yearbook 1991 (Beijing: China Statistical
Information and Consultancy Service Center, 1991), p. 81-82.
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capita with an annual average of 2,312 yuan in 1989.30
Furthermore, the cost of living index in Beijing is in the
lower third of the ranking compared to the other 30
provinces.31  Therfore, from an economic viewpoint, the
quality of living in Beijing is favorable compared to other
areas of China and the level of consumer spending should
increase.
Beijing was ranked 13th in overall retail sales with 30.8
billion yuan in total trades and ranked 13th in consumer goods
sales compared to 30 other provinces in 1990. But consumer
goods accounted for over 95% of all retail sales (agricultural
production accounted for the remainder) .32 Additionally,
Beijing ranked 2nd out of the 30 provinces in retail sales per
30 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistical Yearbook 1990 (Beijing: China Statistical
Information and Consultancy Service Center, 1990), p. 135-136.
Note: The industry attracting the highest wage is Transportation,
Postal and Telecommunication Services (2, 680 annual yuan) , followed
closely by Construction (2,638 annual yuan). Aside from the Energy
sector, these two industries are also the ones which Beijing has
the greatest need to expand.
31 Ibid, p. 253-254.
32 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991, p. 100.
Note: The definition of "Retail sales" was not found in the 1991
Statistical Abstract. However, based on the skewed percentage
towards the Consumer Goods sector, it appears that in addition to
consumer sales to made to individuals, consumer goods sales include
export shipments internationally and goods sold to businesses.
capita (1,981 yuan), behind only Shanghai (2,398).33 This
position is similar to other capital cities throughout the
world which have higher average incomes and stable economies.
Preliminary statistics in 1992 also indicate that
approximately 50% of the income earned by the average Beijing
worker will be applied to basic living necessities, 5% will be
spent on transportation, 30% on clothes, 5% on housing (rent),
and 10% on social functions, hobbies and entertainment.3
Retail sales will become a greater component of a household's
spending in the future with the improvement in the quality of
life and the rise in net income.
33 Estimated from two sources:
A) State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistics Abstract 1991, p.100.
B) State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistical Yearbook 1991, p.81.
Note: See Footnote #32 for caveats regarding the definition of
"Retail Sales". In addition, the population figure used in the
computation was not total population, which was unavailable, but
social labor force totals. Social labor force was not defined but
is considered to reasonably approximate the urban population.
3 Interview with Tsinghua Associate Professor Mao Qizhi, July
11, 1992.
II. URBAN DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS
URBAN DEVELOPMENT CHANGES IN CHINA
In the 1960's and 1970's, China's cities grew moderately in
population, income, economic activity and the stock of urban
housing and infrastructure. This moderate growth had
escalated in 1979 as a result of Deng Xiaoping's reform
measures which began in 1978. In the cities, the
administrative restrictions on light industry and services
were relaxed. As a consequence, urban growth since 1979 has
averaged 13% per year. 35  In addition, rising household
incomes, which have grown approximately 10% per year, 36 have
increased the demand for goods and services.
The momentum of the economic growth has placed a severe strain
on the infrastructure of cities. The need for improved public
services and housing are reaching critical levels because
there is a strong link between the local economic base and the
expansion of urban infrastructure. The demand for labor in
the cities required a modest relaxation of migration controls.
Thus, city growth rates were rising to levels not experienced
35 World Bank, Urban Development in China (unspecified
publisher, May 1989), p. 1.
36 Ibid, p. 1.
36
since the 1950's. Once stagnated cities in the 1960's and
1970's were now growing at rates of 3-4% per annum,37 though
this pace would have been higher if housing shortages did not
exist. In the 1980's, the local government had to reconsider
its approach to planning, financing and managing urban
development.
One method used by the local government to control the growth
in cities, specifically in Beijing, was the use of permanent
residence permits. Those with residence permits were allotted
special privileges that were not granted to temporary
residents, who were only allowed to stay in the city until
their specific work duties were completed. The more important
entitlements for permanent residents were priority status in
obtaining housing and employment.
With modernization through reform, China further encouraged
private economic activity, emphasized foreign trade and
investment and established directives for state-owned
enterprises and utilities to focus on profit-making
strategies.
The key issue currently facing cities is how to balance
sustained economic growth with a program of fiscal and policy
measures to coordinate urban development investments and
37 World Bank, p. 1.
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management.
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Prior to 1979, the Central Government retained the
responsibility of urban development. Line ministries from the
Central Government determined the standards and criteria for
urban development initiatives directly at the local level or
through provincial branches. This was done in a
compartmentalized fashion to various departments at the local
level and there was often little coordination between
departments at every level.
Since 1979, the Central Government has generally limited
itself to a role of encouraging urban development by
establishing broad objectives and parameters. For example,
one broad objective is to reallocate the large accumulation of
household savings into the housing sector where the Central
Government sees home ownership as a major solution to urban
housing demands. However, the Central Government is still
searching for long term solutions with other problems caused
by urban growth such as the surge in temporary residents.
The Central Government strongly endorses the principle that
local services provided by pubic utilities and municipal
housing departments should be financed by the beneficiaries of
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such services. Nonetheless, it will involve itself in
specific local urban development decisions if they: (1) affect
industries and policy within the Central Government's domain
(e.g. government factories) , (2) place a roadblock on efforts
to conserve water resources and water supply utilization, (3)
involve local proposals to generate additional sources of tax
revenues which will threaten revenues to Central Government
and (4) relate to environmental protection such as air and
water pollution (discussed in Environmental Factors section
below).
Therefore, implementing urban development objectives is solely
the responsibility of the local government unless a
development is either specifically covered under the
jurisdiction of the Central Government. The local government
is also encouraged to use this power to experiment in new
ideas and to devise its own systems to effect such policies.
Two major problems exist for local governments in
implementation: (1) Coordination, particularly within
government departments and with public service utilities and
(2) Severe infrastructure constraints, which have led to weak
urban planning and management departments.
Coordination Problems
Unlike a market economy where divisions of responsibility
exist for urban development, China's local urban planning
departments have overlapping responsibility. Secondly, urban
plans for expansion and infrastructure improvements must be
coordinated with public utilities, which do not share the same
autonomy that the local government enjoys. Thirdly, the local
government must be able to separate its regulatory function
from its management operation and to resolve conflicts from
being the approval agency, the developer and the tenant at the
same time. Not surprising, local governments are unlikely to
promote projects in locations which will directly compete with
their own stores. Finally, some coordination must be made
between the social responsibilities (e.g. health plans)
provided by both the local government and the employer such
that both services are not duplicated. Unfortunately, most of
the local governments are not equipped to properly coordinate
development on more than an ad hoc basis.
Infrastructure Limitations
China's urban planning departments are constrained by limited
financial resources and manpower and a shortage of individuals
with urban development expertise and knowledge. The various
demands on the department are becoming more complex in nature.
Thus, city government authorities are overwhelmed by a long
list of "priority" investments that either appear unrelated to
an urban development strategy or can not be fulfilled given
present or future budgetary constraints.
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Key Issues to Address
During the 1980's, cities and towns have invested heavily to
provide the necessary urban infrastructure and public services
to accommodate growth. It is also foreseeable that additional
large-scale infrastructure will be required in the coming
years to match the expected growth and to alleviate the strain
on urban resources. A sector study was performed in China
which identified 5 basic issues38  to address when
accommodating urban growth:
1) Better overall planning and management at the local level
2) Planning and management practices of local line agencies
3) Efficient use and management of existing municipal assets
4) Resource mobilization
5) Control of negative externalities that accompany rapid
economic growth, particularly environmental resource
management
URBAN PLANNING ISSUES IN BEIJING
Beijing currently has a number of unresolved problems 39 in
the urban planning area which af fect the formation of. the city
38 World Bank, p. 3-4.
Note: On these 5 issues, reference in the study was made to the
report, "Zhejiang: Challenges of Rapid Urbanization", Report Number
6612-CHA, dated August 3, 1987.
39 Lecture by Walter Bor, Urban Planning Consultant from
London, England, July 7, 1992.
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and the potential for retail real estate development.
However, these issues are reversible. Beijing will be a more
effectively-designed Capital and retail developments will be
less risky ventures if these problems are properly addressed.
Inflexible Planning
Urban design is based on a master plan (discussed in the
Master Plan section below) which essentially outlines the
projected use and development of a metropolitan area at a
future date. The reliance on public transportation has little
influence on the location of commercial sites in the master
scheme. Underground public subways are basically fixed and do
not adjust to changes in the population nor growth trends.
Instead, public transportation is variable and will be
adjusted to fit the needs of the city. For example, an
unanticipated growth in a certain section of Beijing will not
affect the location of the planned future subway but new bus
lines will be added or old lines will be altered to meet the
needs of that certain area.
Lack of Coordinated Planning
There are coordination problems within the planning area. For
example, in the transportation department, only at-grade
components are considered and mapped. Subway sites and
underground circulation patterns are not drawn but ignored,
which is an egregious mistake since subway sites provide
unique planning issues as well as immense potential for future
retail development sites.
Coordination problems are not confined to the department
itself. As discussed below, there is little communication
between the transportation and urban planning departments,
which function autonomously and on unequal terms.
Excessive Authority for Transportation Engineers
The transportation planning department is omnipotent with
regard to making planning decisions. The section has the
power to dictate its requirements (e.g. widths of roads)
without regard to the issues and concerns of the urban
planning department. This power imbalance continues in spite
of traffic engineers who base their design schemes on very
limited traffic studies, if any are prepared at all. The
urban planning area is powerless to change such mandates and
instead must adjust its plans to accomodate such decisions.
A coordination between both the transportation and the urban
planning departments must be made to assure effective planning
decisions, with both areas carrying the same level of
authority in making urban planning decisions affecting
Beijing. Unilateral decisions made by the transportation
department will increase the risk and construction costs of
such projects since the lifeblood of retail real estate
development depends on effective traffic circulation and
access.
Deficient Detailed Design
Beijing's planning process lacks sufficient detail to develop
conceptual designs. There is therefore no basis nor sense as
to what the planners are trying to achieve with a specific
scheme. For example, not every road is drawn in the master
plan. Therefore, when final planning decisions are made, road
details may provide implementation problems which may
consequently affect the quality of a retail location.
No Implementation Feedback
Beijing's urban- planning process has a fundamental problem of
being prepared in a vacuum without feedback or communication
regarding the relative effectiveness of its implementation.
Plans are designed and delegated as directives by the Economic
Planning Committee while implementation (e.g. for site
improvements) is usually monitored until completion by various
government bureaus. Developers must therefore recognize that
the implementation of an agreement may not always coincide
with the original negotiated deal with the Economic Committee.
Implementation must be coordinated with the planning process
in order to make more effective planning decisions.
optimally, planners and implementers should either be the same
party or in the same department.
Missed Opportunities
In the Beijing region, the city planning area has solid
designs for the future: a 12 million maximum population in
the area, with no more than 6 million people residing within
the immediate urban vicinity. However, in its effort to limit
rapid growth, Beijing has missed opportunities to selectively
and strategically develop sites which will increase the
effectiveness of the city, especially in green areas currently
allocated for park uses. For example, almost all effective
cities in the world have direct or indirect links (through a
network of small towns which provide needed services along the
route) to their airport systems. Beijing currently lacks this
connection and service corridor. These missed opportunities
may provide good areas for future retail development.
Insufficient Knowledge of Economics and Social Ramifications
The urban planning department currently lacks the proficient
knowledge of real estate economics, the skills of financial
analysis and the ability to determine the social ramifications
of building projects. These deficiencies will impede the
planning department's ability to effectively negotiate on even
terms with real estate developers. This may be a short term
advantage for developers, who within limits are able to
construct any project they wish if they are able to raise the
necessary capital. In the long term, training for urban
planners will provide them with the necessary tools and
knowledge to curtail the developer's edge. However, no
training nor plans for such experience are presently
- considered.
Environmental Factors
China had instituted measures to conserve its precious
resources, particularly water.40 This is similar to the U.S.
movement towards environmental preservation and protection.
The impact on development is important. Resources are
required to construct projects and buildings need to be
serviced. If scarce resources are rationed, the location of
a project, its height and its ability to fully function will
be limited. Furthermore, pollution will reduce the expected
duration of projects which need extensive servicing and
maintenance to reach their maximum lives. Finally,
conservation laws such as Environmental Protection and Urban
Afforestation must be understood and factored into the cost of
development.
Key Environmental Conditions Affecting Retail Development
Two of the most important infrastructure issues facing retail
development in Beijing are: (1) Communications and (2) Energy
40 Fresh water is arguably the scarcest resource in China, with
only 2,800 billion cubic meters or a per capita amount of only one-
fourth of the world average. About three-fourth's of China's
cities want more water to meet the demands of their industries and
residents. Source: Ma Zhiping, "Water law enforcement protects
resources", China Daily, July 3, 1992, p. 1.
supply. In a growing economy, the priorities of providing
communication infrastructure and related services can be
reasonably accomplished without excessive harm to the local
environment. However, obtaining sufficient energy sources and
reserves are a more complex problem. Retail establishments
are among the heaviest electrical users, particularly with
their showcases, displays and air conditioning units and
during critical evening business hours.
Currently, coal is used to supply the majority of the required
energy uses for the city, both in the industrial (33.2% of the
Beijing economy per Exhibit A) and residential sectors. This
reliance on coal adversely affects the quality of air since
its processing produces harmful emmissions and releases dust
particles. The quality of air is a chief issue not only for
Beijing but for the Central Government as well.
There are targeted goals to reduce coal reliance for
residential users. However, industrial users, which possess
political clout and financial muscle (in the form of tax
revenues), will continue to use the mineral in the foreseeable
future and the energy shortage is expected to ensue. This
will adversely impact prospective retail real estate
developments by reducing their scale, restricting their
locations, requiring the installation of efficient but
expensive building systems and curtailing critical store
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hours, especially during the evenings.
Air pollution from vehicles is another problem, specifically
exhaust fumes and sulphur dioxide from trucks and cars.
However, retail development is impacted by commuter traffic
which in Beijing is dominated by bicycle and public
transportation uses. Passenger vehicle ownership amounts to
only .25% of the total Beijing population. 41 Therefore, air
pollution from passenger cars will not have a significant
effect on the location of commercial retail development sites
unless a tremendous surge in private auto ownership occurs in
future years.
FUTURE PATTERN OF RETAIL DEVELOPMENT
Urban Core of Beijing
The Master Plan does not identify new areas of retail
development within the heart of Beijing, which presently has
three notable shopping districts: Wangfujing, Xidan and
Qianmen. The future pattern in this core is the redevelopment
of existing shopping areas. Currently, the Wangfujing
Shopping District has been contracted to be redeveloped by a
joint venture between two Hong Kong businessmen and two
Beijing companies.
41 Lecture by urban planning consultant Walter Bor, July 7,
1992.
Outlying Areas of the City
As mentioned in the Beijing Municipality section, much of the
new retail development opportunities will be between the
Second and Third Ring Roads (and possibly beyond). The
pattern of these developments will evolve in two ways. The
first and most prevalent manner is from extremely small and
small tenants who will cluster in a solid business location.
This site is likely to service only the immediate community
and the nearby rural areas since there is little automobile
mobility in Beijing. When the local government realizes that
sufficient opportunities are present, it will construct a
department store in the same area but in the best location.
The local government will generally pay for the site
improvements and construction costs of the department store
but will recoup much of its investment over time by charging
the existing smaller tenants higher taxes. As discussed in
The Master Plan of the City section below, foreign investment
in suburban retail locations like this will be difficult to
attract unless the site is on a subway route.
The second way a shopping district evolves is the converse of
the first pattern. The local government will preempt the
smaller tenants by building at the site first since migration
trends and housing relocation will generate sufficient
critical mass in the specific area. This method is less
common since the local municipality must pay for all building
and site infrastructure costs without the benefit of an
existing tax base from smaller tenants, who are expected to
subsequently migrate into this area. A local government may
not have the wherewithal to initially fund these construction
costs unless the government is supported by taxes or by direct
contributions from affluent farmers with their nearby
factories.
In both of the above scenarios, the conventional shopping
district will be the same, having a government-owned
department store with smaller tenants within the immediate
vicinity. These new shopping areas along the perimeter will
appear similar to the old commercial downtown districts but on
a smaller scale since they primarily service the local
community. These retail districts are unlike the U.S. where
suburban shopping areas consist of malls that are often larger
than their downtown counterparts.
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III. REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN BEIJING
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
There are 5 items which should be discussed before a
description of the process 42 is given. They are: (1) The
Master Plan of the city, (2) Absence of zoning laws, (3) Lack
of public participation, (4) Government jurisdiction in
development process, and (5) Government role as developer.
The Master Plan of the City (Exhibit C)
Prior to initiating the real estate development process,
developers should be aware that master plans for most major
cities in China have already been designed as a basis for
future development. The master plan is the key to what urban
planners envision as the future growth patterns of the city,
taking into account anticipated public transportation access
and requirements, the types of commercial uses and the variety
of public services needed to service the community. In
general, developers should expect to build projects in
accordance with this plan unless a modification could be made,
as explained below.
42 Interviews with Associate Professor Mao Qizhi and Yin Zhi,
PhD, Architecture and Urban Planning Department of Tsinghua
University in Beijing, July 1, 1992. Additional interview with
Hong Wang, Land Administration Lecturer at People's University in
Beijing, June 29, 1992.
The Beijing plan, which runs through the Year 2000, also
stipulates general categories of uses for areas of the city.
These classifications are discussed below and may be specific
(industrial, warehouse) or very broad (working/residential).
With the specific uses, the scale of the master plan is so
small (1 centimeter = 100,000 meters) that exact boundaries
may be difficult to discern. As explained in the previous
Urban Planning Issues in Beijing section, the Capital's urban
planning process (and by implication, the Master Plan) lacks
sufficient detail to produce conceptual designs and to aid in
implementation procedures.
Master plans are generated in 20-year cycles and are rather
inflexible, with modifications in the general design made
every 5 years and detailed changes incorporated every two
years. However, master plans can be adjusted if there is a
drastic shift in the amount, direction and quality of urban
growth. Such trends are usually brought to the government's
attention by a prospective developer or by local people living
in the effected area. Changes will be included only following
a lengthy procedure and sufficient public outcry and pressure.
"Use" Classifications
The Beijing Master plan has nine classifications for existing
and projected use through the Year 2000:
1) Working/Residential
2) Industrial
3) Warehouse
4) Green Area (Park, Sports Facility)
5) Commercial/Service Center (Retail, Post Office)
6) Avenue, Street, Road
7) Railway
8) River, Lake
9) Public Facility
A substantial portion of the Beijing municipality is
designated for "Working/Residential" use, an extremely broad
category which can range from residential housing to retail
shopping centers or commercial office buildings. Developers
therefore have a wide latitude in determining the types of
projects they wish to build. Undeveloped rural areas
constitute the second most prevalent space in the city. No
"use" classification is currently designated for these sites.
However, it is expected that projected uses will be placed in
some of these areas when the new Master Plan through the Year
2020 is completed. "Green Areas" constitute the third most
common zones and are basically used for public parks and
sports facilities. Generally, these sites are not available
for further development. Industrial space and Warehouse-use
identifications rank fourth'and fifth, respectively, in the
amount of reserved area in Beijing. These uses are evenly
distributed along the municipal borders except in the east
side of the city.
The remaining five classifications in aggregate total a
miniscule percentage of the total Beijing municipality.
Included in the remainder is the retail segment, which is
categorized under the Commercial/Service Center
classification. Although little has been specifically
earmarked in the Master Plan for retail uses, retail projects
can be built within the broad domain of "Working/ Residential"
uses. Other categories in this remainder, particularly the
Railway and the Avenue, Street and Road are very important for
planning retail real estate development. Based on a review of
the Master Plan, subway/underground transportation systems are
not on the map, but these are arguably the most important
considerations in retail development.
Projected Retail Sites for the Year 2000
Currently, the Beijing Master Plan through the Year 2000
designates at least 7 new sites for future retail development.
All of these prospective sites are close to the "Third Ring
Road", which is the outermost ring surrounding the
municipality. These retail zones are strategically situated
in locations that are central to planned residential areas,
which are determined based on migration and growth patterns.
If these trends are accurate, then the 7 centrally-located
sites should fare reasonably well.
However, none of these prospective retail sites are on future
subway routes because of uncoordinated transportation and
urban planning functions. Thus, these locations are not
ideal, particularly from an international investment
standpoint. Consequently, securing foreign capital to fund
all construction costs will be extremely difficult. Local
district governments will have to be involved in the
development of these areas although some may not have
sufficient capital to absorb the required site infrastructure
costs.
Absence of Zoning Laws
China does not have true "zoning" laws in the context which is
prevalent in most of the United States (Houston, Texas is a
notable exception). However, there is detailed plannning and
"zoning-like" controls on sites. Such controls may be
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construed to be similar to zoning and cover allowances and
restrictions on the following factors:
1) total site area
2) land use
3) residential capacity (number of housing units)
4) total building coverage on the site
5) building height limits
6) floor-area ratio (FAR)
7) green coverage (open green space)
The combination of the master plan and the above restrictions
provide "zoning-like" functions even though there is no zoning
classification that is common in the U.S. (e.g.M-1, C-2, R-3).
All of the above 7 factors are considered by the Urban
Planning Bureau in approving a large development proposal. In
smaller site proposals, the above practice is still observed
by the Bureau but not all factors may be applied.
The above controls are also troublesome to change. This is
similar to the difficult experiences in the U.S. of obtaining
higher re-zoning classifications. Only in special situations
where the relative power between the developer and the local
government is imbalanced will modifications be made. For
example, if a developer with abundant capital offers to build
needed projects in a poor community but makes it conditional
upon securing higher density and other concessions, then it is
likely that a successful deal with the local government will
be negotiated.
Lack of Public Participation
The only public forum in the development process is in the
housing sector, where residents are solicited for their
personal opinions on the type of housing they feel is
appropriate to improve their standard of living. In addition,
they are sought for detailed suggestions as to the size of the
living room, the number of bedrooms and the total square
meters of housing they feel they need. The government is
typically responsive to the needs of the people and in
improving their quality of life.
In commercial developments, no such hearing exists. Once the
government decides on the location of a commercial project
such as a retail department store, there is little the public
can do to cease the process. In general, local communities
currently do not mind such developments since they feel that
these are good signs of progress. In the future, citizens may
insist on a forum for public discussion as they become more
socially and environmentally aware of the drawbacks of such
projects.
Government Jurisdiction in Development Process
The determination of which committee will be involved in the
development process depends on the type, size and location of
the project. If the urban project is a government factory or
a public utility, the Economic Planning Committee of the
Central Government participates in the process. If the urban
project does not involve one with Central Government
jurisdiction, then the Economic Development Committee of the
local government will be involved. It is not unusual that
both government committees are included in overlapping
jurisdictional matters but the Central Government has higher
authority in final decisions.
The Land Administration Bureau of the Central Government is
also involved in the process if a proposed agricultural site
development is situated in one of Beijing's 8 counties and
consists of more than 1,000 'mu's, (approximately 658
hectares) of rural land or 2,000 'mu's (1,316 hectares) of
'other' land such as a mountainous region. The Land
Administration of Bureau of the local government participates
in the meetings if the subject land is 1,000 'mu's or less.
Some conflicts may emerge between the goals of the two Central
Government entities or between the two local authorities. A
Committee has a higher standing than a "Bureau" in the
hierarchy of government structures. Therefore, the Committee
usually casts the final decision when an unresolved dispute
arises.
The local economic planning committee will usually be the
representative government authority because the Central
Government is attempting to decentralize urban decision-making
to local municipalities. Therefore, unless the situation
requires its presence, the Central Government will not become
involved in the approval process.
Government Role as Developer
In the U.S., the government has been increasing its
participation in the development process, particularly in the
housing and the retail segments (Horton Plaza in San Diego,
California and Pike's Market in Seattle, Washington). These
arrangements for retail projects have usually been structured
using public/private partnerships because of the lack of
development experience and the shortage of capital. The local
government rarely, if ever is the sole developer. However, it
is common in China for the government to be exclusively
involved in such projects, particularly in medium and large
scale retail shopping sites where a government store serves as
the anchor tenant.
Most Beijing retail shopping areas with municipal-owned
department stores are government-developed. Smaller tenants
on the site are predominantly sole proprietors, who not only
own the businesses but also the buildings adjacent to the
anchor department store. The real estate development process
(discussed below) tends to face fewer obstacles, a shorter
review period and a faster construction schedule since the
project is government-related.
In prior years, it was not unusual for new retail shopping
areas to be developed under a domestic Joint venture
arrangement between the local government and the smaller
indigenous Chinese retail tenants. The government currently
welcomes such ventures because it may lack sufficient capital
to solely provide both the site infrastructure and building
improvements.
The more recent trend is for major retail shopping areas to be
either developed or redeveloped by foreign ioint ventures.
For example, the popular Wangfujing shopping district will be
redeveloped into a major tourist shopping destination by Hong
Kong billionaire Li-Kai Shing, Chinese hotel developer Robert
Kuok, and two Beijing companies. 43 In addition, the Pu Dong
New Area on the east side of Shanghai will have two major
foreign retail development projects involving funds from Hong
Kong and Japan.44 Finally, the Lufthansa Center (see below
43 "Beijing commercial district to be redeveloped", China
Business Review, (Beijing), June 28, 1992, p. 1.
44 "More overseas cash pours in", China Daily, (Beijing), July
6, 1992, p. 2.
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section for details) containing the You Yi Friendship Store
was recently completed and opened for business on July 1,
1992.45
DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN BEIJING (Exhibit D)
Application Submission
The real estate development process for urban projects begins
with an application submittal by a developer to the Economic
Planning Committee, which may either be the Central Government
or the local muncipality (see above Government Jurisdiction in
Development Process section).
The application submittal is akin to a real estate development
proposal or a business plan. A market study assessment and an
economic analysis are required in the submittal and are
prepared by either the developer or by a third party, usually
a consulting firm or a university. It is difficult to
determine their adequacy using U.S. standards since these
reports are proprietary. The developer is responsible for the
costs of these studies (unless the government itself is the
developer), which will be reviewed by the government.
45 Interview with Ms. Li Hang Nan, Public Relations Department
of the Lufthansa Development Project, July 12, 1992.
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In addition to the market and economic reports, the conceptual
design schemes, the specific site requested for the project,
the type of use (which conforms to a master plan as discussed
above) and the project financing scheme (e.g. structured as a
joint venture with government participation) are required.
Meeting with the Economic Planning Committee
Once the complete application submittal has been reviewed by
the appropriate government authority, a meeting will be
arranged with the developer to discuss the final decision on
the real estate development proposal. If successful, the
developer is informed of the site the government has selected
for his development and the constraints (e.g. height
limitations, floor area ratio and green space requirements)
placed on the chosen location. It is not uncommon for the
actual site to be different from the site requested by the
developer, who has the final option to accept the selected
location or to proceed onto his next project.
If the developer agrees with the conditions set forth by the
Economic Planning Committee, he/she then must solicit approval
of the project from other government organizations and
departments with a regulatory interest in the project. For
example, the joint venture must be approved to conduct
business in China by the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade (MOFERT) if the entity used to finance the
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project is a foreign joint venture. It must be approved by
the Environmental Protection Department for compliance with
anti-pollution regulations if the project is a factory. It
must obtain a business permit by the Department of Commerce if
the project is a supermarket. In general, all new projects
are filtered through approximately 50 departments 46 within
the government to determine whether there is appropriate
jurisdiction for their involvement.
Design Plans, Design Review and Site Assemblage
After all of the general approvals have been granted, the
developer then contracts an architect to produce detailed
design plans which will incorporate the constraints placed by
the government. The completed detailed plans will then be
submitted and discussed with the Urban Planning Bureau
(Central or local government level, depending upon the type of
project) for general review and compliance with restrictions.
Once approved by the Bureau, the developer may then proceed
with construction.
The government will be responsible for assembling the site
parcels and providing the site improvements for the project.
However, in reality, the extent of its commitment depends on
its cash situation. In most instances, the municipality will
pay for necessary site work in successful areas where it has
46 Interview with Hong Wang, June 29, 1992.
a surplus of cash (e.g. Wangfujing Shopping District) . But in
other cases where the local government has little money, the
developer will absorb the infrastructure cost.
Displaced residents in the effected area are relocated to
other locations in Beijing and are indirectly compensated for
this move by receiving a larger residence at no additional
cost (the ratio of the amount of new to old living space is
typically 2:1) .47 In general, this system appears to work
well because most residents prefer additional space in an
inferior location than less space in a better site. The
physical relocation of residents is the responsibility of the
local government. Nevertheless, like site improvements and
assemblages discussed above, the party which bears the
displacement costs is primarily determined by the cash
situation of the local government. If the local government
has sufficient cash resources, it will usually pay for the
displacement. If not, the developer will then pay for the
move. Current trends are for both the developer and the
government to share the costs of relocation, with the ratio
determined based on negotiation.
Project Construction
Once all design plans have been reviewed, approved and site
infrastructure is in place, the physical construction will
47 Interview with Yin Zhi, PhD, July 1, 1992.
begin. The actual construction of the project involves a
process that is similar to one in the United States since
permits are required for certain services provided (e.g.
installation of elevators) and various departments of the
local planning office will check for compliance with design
plans and building codes. The Public Safety Bureau will
oversee the project for health and safety code violations.
Internal mechanisms for control include inspectors
representing the major tenant(s) (e.g. the government
department store) as well as those representing the joint
venture investors.
The biggest obstacle in the construction process is not in
building the structure but in procuring the necessary raw
materials at the most effective prices. The Central
Government controls virually all of the domestic raw materials
used in the construction of development projects.
Upon securing project approval, the Central Government gives
rights to the developer to purchase specific quantities of
selected raw materials in China at prices which are more
favorable than imported rates (after taking into account
shipping costs and customs tax assessments). The developer
may then decide to buy the raw goods from the Chinese
government and/or to import some or all material requirements.
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Some goods are more scarce (steel) than others (concrete).
The Central Government may therefore allocate purchase rights
for quantities which will cover only a fraction of the total
raw materials needed to complete the project. Generally,
there is no appeal procedure to request additional purchase
rights. Nonetheless, a developer with substantial capital in
a large scale project may successfully negotiate an agreement
with the Central Government to purchase more than his/her
share of the raw materials allocation at favorable prices.
Post-Construction Development Functions
In retail construction projects throughout China, it is common
for the developer to be solely responsible for providing the
basic building shell and for securing an anchor tenant, which
is usually the local government (e.g. Friendship Store).
Tenant fit-out and regular operating functions such as
maintenance is the responsibility of the lessee. This is
similar to retail arrangements made in the U.S. which are
often on a net lease basis, where the tenant is responsible
for certain expenses such as real estate taxes, insurance and
maintenance (triple net lease) or for all expenses (absolute
net lease).
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Business Investment
In general, foreign investment in China reflects diametrically
opposite goals between the investors and the Chinese
Government. International investors generally want to
establish a base in China to sell goods domestically. They
also need to freely convert Chinese currency into foreign
exchange for profit repatriation. However, the Chinese prefer
to have foreign companies invest their capital in the PRC to
tap the industrious people of the country and to produce and
sell goods for export in the international markets. It is the
friction between these divergent goals and political factors
which until the 1980's have made investment in China sluggish.
As a major breakthrough, the Lufthansa Center development was
able to successfully merge these conflicting goals into an
agreement which was beneficial for both the Chinese government
and the foreign investors. The local government had achieved
its goal of attracting foreign capital (one billion German
Marks) and the German joint venture partner was able to
exploit the lucrative domestic retail business in China and
receive convertible foreign exchange. The structure of this
joint venture is discussed in more detail in the below Example
of Joint Venture Structure: Beijing Lufthansa Center section.
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As of 1990, U.S. companies entered into agreements for more
than 1,300 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures
and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China. In 1990, there
were U.S. business contracts for 357 new projects or 29% more
than the number of 1989 contracts. However, the total value
of those contracts amounted to $357 million (U.S.), or 44%
lower than the total value in 1989.48 Although investment
figures are not available in 1992, a survey of U.S. firms has
indicated that one-third of those without a China presence
will make an initial investment in the next five years, while
two-thirds of those already there will expand their
operations, particularly in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. 49
Real Estate Investment
Real estate foreign investment in China during the 1980's has
originated primarily from two sources: (1) Hong Kong/Macao
and (2) Taiwan. The investments involved a number of
commercial project types, ranging from hotels to mixed-use
office complexes. More recently, Hong Kong/Macao and Taiwan
investments have been increasing with the relaxation of land
lease sales and terms to foreign investors. Many of these
funds have been in the housing sector within the Guangdong
province and within the Special Economic Zones of Xiamen and
48 USC International Business Education & Research (IBEAR)
Program, p. 54.
49 "U.S. firms upbeat on presence in China", China Daily,
(Beijing), June 26, 1992, p. 2.
Shenzhen.
Other countries which have participated in the real estate
arena include those investors from Europe (Germany and Italy) ,
the Far East (Japan and South Korea) and North America (Canada
and United States). Most of these developments have been in
the hotel and office segments. The U.S. investment in China
has been light, with only limited amounts mainly in the
franchise hotel sector (e.g. Beijing Sheraton, Guangzhou
Holiday Inn) and in branch office developments.
Currently, China's real estate business is the hot-selling
investment for foreign investors. In 1991, there were 280
foreign-funded property firms in the Shanghai municipality and
in the Guangdong, Hainan and Fujian provinces, which are
considered the major areas of overseas investment in real
estate. 50 China also saw $216 million of foreign investment
placed in commercial building development during the same
year, earning $203 million from commercial building sales to
foreigners.5 1
There are no data statistics specifically kept on retail real
estate development although it is evident that investment in
retail projects is growing (e.g. the Lufthansa Center and
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50 Ling, p. 1.
51 Ibid, p. 1.
Wangfujing District in Beijing, and the Pu Dong Area in
Shanghai).
Foreign investment in China real estate and specifically in
retail development is expected to escalate in the 1990's given
the foreseeable formal trade relations with Korea, the
predicted improvement in banking services and the imminent
relaxation of laws and regulations, specifically with land
lease reforms throughout China. The Guangdong province and
the Special Economic Zones are currently the only areas
undergoing such land reforms. Land leases to foreigners will
be of particular interest to the PRC since more than 1,500
tracts of land covering 3,000 hectares were leased to various
overseas enterprises during 1992 (through June 25) and the
government had gained a record 3.1 billion yuan ($574 U.S.
million) of income from land-use rights leasing.52
The trend in real estate development will not only be confined
to commercial buildings in the coastal regions of China but
will include vast mixed-use land development (including
retail) in such inland regions as the Hubei and Henan
provinces5 3  and in Beijing (Daitianshuijing area of
Wangufujing commercial district)
52 "China pins hopes on land-lease reforms", China Daily,
(Beijing), June 26, 1992, p. 1.
53 Ling, p. 1.
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FOREIGN BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS
In general, foreign real estate entities can be categorized in
one of the two following forms:
1) Joint Venture: Equity and Contractual
2) Wholly Foreign-Owned Venture
As of 1985, joint ventures were by far the most popular form
of business contracts signed. However, with the relaxation of
restrictions on wholly foreign-owned ventures, the fastest
growing business arrangements (not all real estate-related)
are foreign-only capital enterprises, which had doubled the
number of contracts in only one year: 931 for $1.654 U.S.
billion in 1989 and 1,860 for $2.444 U.S. billion in 1990.54
Joint Ventures
Joint ventures with foreign companies are probably the most
desired form of international business arrangement in China.
It allows the Chinese to learn real estate development with
minimum cost since the capital and technology are brought into
the venture by the foreign firm. From 1979 to 1985, $3.4 U.S.
billion had been committed to 2,301 joint ventures (general
54 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistical Abstract 1991, p. 111.
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business and not all real estate) .55
' In 1990, there were 4,091 projects under contract (not all
real estate) for a total value of approximately $2.7 U.S.
billion, most of which were not from the U.S.5 6 The American
share of the total has decreased during the past few years.
This is in spite of the increasing levels of foreign
investment in China due to economic reforms.
The laws and regulations governing all joint ventures are
substantially developed but they are still evolving. The
entire legal system continues to undergo reform. Therefore,
these codes should be considered nothing more than guidelines
since policies continue to change and regulations are
arbitrarily applied.
Currently, a standard joint venture contract (equity joint
ventures only) is available to establish such a partnership.
However, important details are missing and an attorney is
required to tailor the contract to the specific arrangement
and to incorporate appropriate protective language. This
process is therefore time consuming. Some foreign companies
prefer to immediately set up a temporary branch while the
55 Chu Baotai, Foreign Investment in China: Questions and
Answers (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Inc., 1986) p. 66.
56 State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China,
China Statistical Abstract 1991, p. 111.
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contractual arrangement is in process. This is done to bridge
the time frame between establishing the joint venture and
initiating operations. Once finalized, operations from the
branch will be transferred to venture.
There are two basic forms of a joint venture: contractual and
equity.
Equity Joint Venture
In an equity venture (see Exhibit E for a sample standard
contract), a joint enterprise is initially created for the
specific purpose of developing a single property. Both the
Chinese and the foreign partner contribute equity and as
general partners they share in the investment, management,
operations, risks and profits/losses. Earnings are
distributed according to the respective equity contributions
of each partner.
The type of equity contribution differs for each party. The
Chinese normally contribute land, site infrastructure, some
machinery, materials and labor. The foreign partner is
expected to contribute the technology, capital equipment and
machinery, marketing and management expertise and working
capital.
A limited liability corporation is then formed to hold the
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investment and to manage the property if it is not sold
following completion. Risk and profits/losses are then shared
according to a negotiated formula.
Minimum foreign investment is set at 25% of the total capital
although in some instances the percentage can be negotiated as
high as 100%. Generally, there is a joint board of directors
with a Chinese person holding the title of Chairman. These
joint ventures typically range between 5 and 30 years in
duration, with the preferred term of 10 years. In rare cases
are agreements greater than 50 years allowed. The property
reverts to the control of the Chinese upon the expiration of
the joint venture contract.57
Foreign investors have been able to cope with these time
frames, particularly mortgage lenders such as banks which as
a standard practice use "bullet" loans that amortize (i.e.
reduce the principal owed with each payment made) over 30
years but have outstanding balances due in 10 years
("balloon"). Yields to lenders are increased to account for
the possible payoff uncertainty (no cash to pay balloon) or
refinancing risk (no lender to re-loan the amount of the
balloon) at the time the note matures. Equity investors
adjust to shorter terms by requiring additional returns on a
shorter contract life. For example, the original Lufthansa
57 Arthur Andersen & Co, p. 168.
offer (details are provided below in the Example of Joint
Venture Structure: Beijing Lufthansa Center section) by the
German joint venture partner called for a 17 year term with
rent payments substantially in excess of 47 million yuan per
year. When the Chinese government balked at the bid, the
final agreement was negotiated to 47 million yuan per year but
over a 30 year term.58
Deal structuring can take many forms: mortgage debt, equity,
or a combination of both. Equity investors also are known to
finance a portion or all of their investment using mortgages
that mature at or near the end of the joint venture contract
term.
Joint equity ventures are also subject to minimum registered
capital requirements ratios. The table listed below59
represents the total minimum registered capital as a function
of the total investment.
58 Interview with Ms. Li Hang Nan, Lufthansa Development
Project, July 12, 1992.
59 Arthur Andersen & Co, p. 169.
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Total Investment ($ U.S.)
1. Less than 3 million
2. Between 3 and 10 million
3. Between 10 and 30 million
4. Greater than 30 million
Reauired Minimum Capital
70% of total investment
Higher of 2.1 million or
50% of total investment
Higher of 5 million or
40% of total investment
Higher of 12 million or
33 1/3% of total
investment
Under the Law of Joint Ventures, three reserve funds are
required to be established and funded based on after-tax
earnings. The three funds are: (1) Joint Venture Reserve
Fund, to buffer potential operating losses and accidents, (2)
Incentive and Welfare Fund, for joint venture employees to
reward commendable work and (3) Enterprise Fund, to reserve
for future expansion. The actual amounts placed in each fund
are decided by the Board of Directors and are usually based on
a fixed percentage of profits. 60
As discussed in the above Revamping the Commercial Code
section, some trade regulations and tax laws were amended in
60 Guide to Joint Equity Ventures (Beijing: The External
Services Department of the Economic Daily, 1986), p. 35-36;
Michael J. Moser, Foreign Trade, Investment & the Law in the
People's Republic of China (London: Oxford University Press, 1989),
p. 134.
1990 (e.g. a foreign person may become Chairman, the duration
of joint venture arrangements may be extended beyond the
general 30 year limit) to relax the stringent restrictions
placed on foreign joint ventures.
Contractual or Cooperative Joint Venture
Another form of partnership is the contractual or cooperative
joint venture. This arrangement has many characteristics that
are similar to the equity structure but it also has a number
of differences. First, the contractual arrangement is
governed by separate laws (Contractual Joint Venture Laws
rather than the Joint Venture Laws), which are vague and
unfamiliar to the Chinese, who are more comfortable with the
equity joint venture arrangement.
Secondly, the contributions of the foreign partner into a
contractual venture are not considered "equity" shares, which
entitle the partner to a share of the real estate profits as
a percentage of the capital invested. Instead, such
investments receive profit distributions based on the terms of
the joint venture contract, which may or may not be in
proportion to the amounts contributed. For example, a typical
contractual arrangement may function in the following manner.
A foreign partner's non-monetary (land, machinery and
equipment, labor) and monetary contributions are initially
inventoried and valued at the time of investment. The total
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valuation is then considered the base from which a priority
rate of return ("preferred return") is assessed and
distributed from profits earned in later years. The priority
distribution is paid first in any year where profits are made
by the joint venture. Any earnings in excess of the amounts
initially distributed are then allocated to each partner based
on percentages negotiated in the joint venture contract. This
ratio may or may not be relative to the proportion of
investment contributions made by each party.
Thirdly, a contractual joint venture is not bound by the 25%
minimum foreign capital requirement that is required under an
equity arrangement. There is therefore more flexibility to
structure innovative contracts.
Fourth, this business arrangement is not restricted to a
finite legal life (generally 30 years under a standard equity
joint venture). Instead, the duration of the venture is
stipulated within the contract, which may run longer than the
maximum legal limit for equity joint ventures.
Furthermore, unlike its equity counterpart which requires
three types of reserve funds to be funded based on after-tax
earnings, no reserve fund is required under this form.
Finally, this arrangement allows for the recovery of initial
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capital invested during the term of the contract. The equity
venture arrangement is rigid: the initial capital invested
must remain in the partnership as long as it is in existence.
In both types of venture, the hard assets (developed real
estate project, machinery and equipment) must remain in the
hands of the Chinese at the end of the contract term.
With its limited liability and preferred return
characteristics, the above form is similar to a limited
partnership entity used to structure many real estate
transactions in the United States. The capital-contributing
foreign joint venture partner is akin to a limited partner,
who is initially given a preferred distribution before both
partners 61 are allowed to share in the remaining proceeds.
Most if not all foreign partnerships are structured as equity
joint ventures because the Chinese are not familiar with this
form of arrangement and the contractual joint venture laws are
vague and undeveloped.
Example of Joint Venture Structure: Beiiing Lufthansa Center
The You Yi Shopping City/Beijing Lufthansa Center is a Sino-
German equity ioint venture (called Beijing Lufthansa Center
Co. Ltd) between the local government of Beijing and a German
61 The Chinese partner corresponds to the general partner in
a limited partnership while the foreign partner is parallel to the
limited partner.
partnership consisting of two entities: a majority German
partner comprised of various German companies and a minority
South Korean partner (see Exhibit F). The joint venture
contract was signed in 1985 and opening day occurred over 7
years later on July 1, 1992. The project is not wholly retail
but is a three part mixed-use development consisting of a 5-
star 540-room hotel (Kempinski Hotel), a 6-story plus basement
government-owned Friendship department store (You Yi Shopping
City) and a multi-story office/apartment complex.62
The center does not have either on-site or underground
vehicular parking but relies on availability along the street
and temporary zones to accommodate autos. Since the retail
store and the hotel began their operations in July 1992 (the
office/apartment complex is complete but not fully
functional), the retail has been in need of parking space to
accommodate approximately 500 cars during rush hour.
Additionally, there are no separate areas for bicycles, which
may be stationed only along the nearby Liangma River. These
are issues that were not originally anticipated in the
original design scheme. No plans currently exist to address
the bicycle problem although underground parking is currently
being proposed to rectify the vehicular situation.
62 Interview with Ms. Li Hang Nan, Lufthansa Development
Project, July 12, 1992.
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Terms of Joint Venture Contract:
The terms of the Beijing Lufthansa joint venture are
summarized in Exhibit G. The structure of the venture
required an investment by the foreign partner of one billion
German Marks to fund the total building construction costs.
Of the one billion investment, $30 U.S. million was
contributed by a Korean minority partner, whose percentage of
the foreign partner's interest was not disclosed.
The Chinese joint venture partner was the Beijing local
government which contributed land, site improvements, labor
and some raw materials. The local government borrowed 120
million yuan (about $22 U.S. million) on favorable terms from
the Bank of China to finance its equity share. Even though
the exact details were not disclosed, the Beijing municipality
was loaned the sum at very low interest rates and paid
interest on only 90 of the 120 million yuan owed. There were
no other equity partners on the Chinese side of the venture.
The local government department store signed a contract with
the German Joint Venture partner to remit minimum annual lease
payments of 47 million yuan per year plus a percentage of
gross sales (.2% for the first three years, .4% for the
remainder of the term). These lease payments are payable in
Foreign Exchange Certificates (FEC), the official exchange
currency of China which is readily convertible into other
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foreign denominations. The payment to foreign investors in
readily exchangable currency was specifically negotiated with
the local government and bypassed the Central Government's
system of keeping domestically earned profits within China's
domain. Methods used to remove profits from China are
discussed in more detail in the below Profit Repatriation
Issue section.
The foreign partner's pretax cash-on-cash return on an
allocated retail investment base of 912 million yuan was
calculated to be between 5.3% and 5.4%, with an internal rate
of return of 3.4%. This assumed that rent overages (.2% or
.4% of gross sales) were computed based on daily gross store
receipts of 1.5 million yuan.
These investor yields appear low but it is inappropriate to
dissect mixed-use developments into their component parts for
analysis unless all portions of the financial scheme are
understood. It is therefore possible that the remaining
unexamined segments of this development may yield well in
excess of 25%, thereby increasing the overall yield above 15%,
a normal rate of return expected by real estate development
investors.
The Chinese joint venture partner annually receives any excess
over the amounts initially paid to the foreign partner. In
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addition, at the end of the contract term, the Beijing local
government receives the whole development project as
reversion. It is difficult to determine the approximate
yields to the Chinese partner because information is either
unavailable or contingent upon results.
Early Results:
The You Yi Department Store has only been opened since July 1,
1992 but it has already shown solid signs of success. Its
first Sunday following Opening Day grossed 2.2 million yuan
and it averaged daily visitations of 50,000 people. The
majority of these customers were local residents although
there was also a good mixture of foreign tourists.
There have been complaints that the store hours (9:00am to
9:00pm) were too short and that no parking was available.
Beijing has a miniscule percentage of passenger car ownership
but apparently many car owners shop at the You Yi Friendship
Store. This parking problem will remain as a short term issue
but thus far the results of this store have been impressive.
Future Joint Venture Structures
The Central Government is currently easing regulations on
wholly foreign-owned real estate investments. Thus, more of
these structures will be formed because of greater profits
earned by the foreign partner. The important and value-added
"guanxi" (i.e. China's synonym for local business and
government contacts) that Chinese partners provide in a joint
venture arrangement can be "bought" since consultants can be
hired and retained throughout the development process.
Wholly-owned enterprises (see below Wholly Foreign-Owned
Ventures section) will be difficult to negotiate with the
local government, which has reversion rights to the developed
property at the end of the land contract term and will want
possession at an earlier date. The choice for the foreign
partner in a retail development project will probably be
between a standard equity joint venture arrangement for the
maximum term (30 years) as one option and a wholly foreign-
owned entity with a shorter period to reversion as the other
alternative.
Selection of Appropriate Joint Venture Partner
The selection of a partner is critical to the success of any
business as well as a joint venture. There are many factors
to consider in the selection process but the most important
consideration is the honesty of the Chinese partner. There
can be no trust without a candid partner and there can be no
sustainable partnership if there is no confidence.
Another major factor to consider is the power and the local
influence of the Chinese partner ("guanxi"). Much money and
time will be saved if the Chinese partner is able to smoothen
differences with the political forces and is capable of
streamlining the business process.
Other critical factors to weigh are: (1) Financial capability
of the Chinese partner, (2) Compatibility of the goals between
each partner, (3) Quality of the Chinese partner's workforce
and management and (4) Ability of the Chinese partner to
secure vital raw materials and supplies.
Even though most of the above factors are intuitive, it is
important to form a partnership that will fill voids in the
current organization and will accomplish both parties'
objectives. It is easier to form a joint venture with any
Chinese organization than it is to find an appropriate and
compatible Chinese partner.
Profit Repatriation Issue
This is probably the most significant factor discouraging
investment in China. Profits earned outside of its legal
domain are free from any restrictions and controls. However,
all earnings within the jurisdiction of the PRC must stay
within its borders if the foreign exchange account is
deficient. 63  This requirement is a measure by China to
63 A foreign exchange account is deficient when a company's
cumulative profits repatriated are greater than its cumulative
foreign investment or when total imports exceed total exports.
85
prevent capital from leaving the country and to insulate the
price of its currency from international influences.
Therefore, a joint venture 'with positive net income but a
deficient foreign exchange account (total RMB is greater than
total foreign currency) may not repatriate its earnings back
to its domicile country.
The ramifications of the above restrictions on joint ventures:
foreign exchange accounts must be properly balanced and
consistently maintained to substantiate allowable profit
repatriation.
The restrictions on earnings exportation are cumbersome but
they may be circumvented by real estate companies in four
ways. First, a foreign retail development investment partner
with deficient foreign exchange (i.e. cumulative gains
repatriated are greater than cumulative foreign investment)
but is profitable may remove net income by entering into a
transaction with a foreign currency swap center. This center
will match the subject company having deficient foreign
exchange with any company possessing excess foreign exchange.
The transactions for these swaps are made at market prices and
the center makes a small fee (approximately .15%). 4  The
results of these centers as judged by foreign exchange
investors have been mixed since some centers have been more
6 Arthur Andersen & Co, p. 124.
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responsive (Hainan) than others (Beijing) in consummating
transactions. Important in receiving responsive treatment
from foreign exchange swap centers are size (the larger the
transaction, the stronger the influence on the center) and
"guanxi" (strong business contacts).
Secondly, as mentioned in the above Example of Joint Venture
Structure: Beijing Lufthansa Center section, if the retail
joint venture partner is the local government, the business
arrangement may be structured such that rent payments to the
foreign joint venture partner will be paid in Foreign Exchange
Certificates (FEC) rather than Reminbi's (RMB) . FEC's are the
official exchange currency of China and they are freely
convertible into any foreign denomination without restrictions
or controls by the Central Government.
Thirdly, regulations allow companies (such as international
real estate firms) with deficient exchange to invest their
Reminbi profits in other joint ventures (not required to be
real estate in nature) which have the capacity to generate
excess foreign currency balances. Such investments are given
preferential tax treatment and the re-investing party is
allowed to enjoy priority access to the new enterprise's
foreign exchange income for the repatriation of earnings.
However, the above arrangement must be approved by (1) foreign
economic relations and trade and (2) exchange control
authorities.65
Finally, this popular method is not directly related to retail
development partnerships but may have undiscovered
applications in future retail joint ventures, particularly
those that cater to foreign tourists. Currently, if the real
estate project is a four or five-star international hotel, the
hotel corporation's ability to collect credit card balances
outside of China (by the hotel corporation's accounts
receivable department situated in another country) allows it
to legally siphon profits from its China franchise operations.
Most revenues are collected in this manner and the hotel
corporation must redirect an allocated portion of collections
back to the franchise in the PRC to sufficiently cover the
hotel's operating and general and administrative expenses.
The unallocated excess or the residual profits will remain in
the hotel corporation's domicile country free from China's
control.
This loophole for international hotels has been ignored by the
Central Government, which prefers more to attract and benefit
from business generated by foreign tourists than to lose this
commerce by placing encumbering restrictions on such lodging
franchises.
65 Guide to Joint Equity Ventures, p. 51-52.
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Dispute Resolution
The Chinese prefer to settle business disputes through
friendly means rather than adjudication since using the legal
process is considered distasteful and would alienate critical
business associates. Legal avenues are available for the
settlement of conflicts and the following three "friendly"
methods are preferred: (1) Settlement by friendly
negotiation, (2) Consultation and (3) Conciliation.
Under the settlement through friendly negotiations, the
parties engage in direct negotiations without involving an
arbitration official. With the consultation method, the
dispute is brought to the attention of either the Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) or the Maritime
Arbitration Commission (MAC), depending upon the nature of the
disagreement. The third party will not recommend any solution
but instead will mediate the deliberation such that the
parties will work out the problems themselves. The final
"friendly" method is the conciliation process. Under this
formula, the same two organizations will be chosen to assist
in the resolution process. Unlike the second method where the
organization plays no active role, this method involves
"concrete suggestions" made by the third party in a written
format to both parties. However, these suggestions are not
binding on either party.
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Most joint venture disputes that are unresolved through
friendly means or by compromise are usually settled through
binding arbitration. Standard joint venture contracts include
an arbitration clause (see- Exhibit E, Article 59 of Chapter 22
in the Standard Joint Venture Contract). The arbitration
agency in China is the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade unless both parties mutually agree to use
another source.
There is the general belief that a fair decision will be made
by a Chinese judge who is impartial but the fact is that an
arbitrator will have Chinese conventions and acquired
convictions which may affect his/her ultimate decision. In
some cases, national arbitration laws expressly require the
arbitrators to observe local justice and customs.
China will accept the procedures used by an organization in
arbitration cases that are determined by a foreign agency.
However, the PRC may not bind the final arbitration decision
since a Chinese-Foreign joint venture is deemed to be a
Chinese "legal" person, which is subject to jurisdiction by
Chinese law only.
As an alternative to arbitration, the U.S. established an
Embassy-based working group in 1989 to raise specific investor
concerns with China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade (MOFERT). This group meets quarterly to discuss
' U.S. investment problems in'China. As of May 1991, over 40
company problems were raised at these working group meetings
and most were resolved."
A second alternative to arbitration is through the judicial
process. Usually the People's Court in China is not involved
in any dispute resolution process unless both parties agree to
such a procedure and there is no binding arbitration clause in
the joint venture contract. If such a clause exists, the
court either will not hear the case or in those instances
where a decision has been made, will not re-open a final
decision determined through the binding arbitration process.
Very seldom do joint venture disputes ever go to arbitration.
There is currently no record of any existing arbitration case
involving foreign retail development joint ventures.
Wholly Foreign-Owned Ventures
This business arrangement does not require any Chinese
involvement in either management or profit-sharing. In
addition, the foreign company has complete control over its
captive enterprise.
6 "Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the
United States", U.S. Embassy Annual Publication, (Beijing), May
1992, p. 12.
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However, this structure has the operational burden of locating
the following two scarce resources: (1) Trained local
manpower and (2) Domestic raw materials. It must also face
the prospect of dealing with local authorities without the
benefit of having a Chinese partner to smoothen differences.
Thirdly, except in Special Economic Zones and in the 14
Coastal Port Cities, equity joint ventures get better income
tax treatment than wholly foreign-owned ventures.67 Finally,
it is subject to the same general approval and registration
process required of joint ventures as well as compliance with
the many rules and regulations applicable to foreign
enterprises operating in China.
67 Though not promulgated in the regulations, this drawback is
expected to be alleviated since a unified tax system is likely to
replace both laws.
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IV. RETAIL MINI CASE STUDIES
LONGFUSI TEMPLE SHOPPING DISTRICT
Location
The Longfusi Temple is an existing shopping district that is
located in the eastern section of the Beijing Downtown core.
The site runs along an east/west pedestrian road with limited
vehicular access for taxis and loading trucks. Unlike other
shopping districts in the city that are situated along
prominent street corridors, this one is of the "back street"
or "back alley" variety, which establishes its success away
from major streets. This shopping area is bounded by West
Dongsi Street to the south, Qianliang Street to the north,
North Dongsi Street to the east and East National Gallery
Street to the west.
The focal point of the retail area is the Longfusi Department
Store, an 8-story building situated at the center core of the
site and in the same location as the Longfusi Temple, which
had burned down in 1901. The religious aspects have
diminished but the vitality of the commercial vein has
increased over the years.
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Target Customers
This district thrives predominantly on business from community
residents and is well-known locally for its fine dining. This
shopping area also attracts some tourists. The Longfusi
department store estimates that approximately 30% of its gross
receipts is derived from international visitors.6
Current State of the Site
The redevelopment of the Longfusi Shopping District is
presently in limbo. The government is generating sufficient
profits from the department store to provide only some (a
small radius around the "T" axis) but not all of the
infrastructure requirements of the commercial area.
Additional and substantial capital is needed to fund further
improvements throughout the retail site. Cash reserves are
also needed for site infrastructure (sewage and utility
systems) along the neighboring streets and in the adjacent
housing areas, which the government hopes will be funded by
the same developer who is granted this commercial
redevelopment project.
Evaluation from Foreign Developer's Standpoint
Site Analysis
The Longfusi Shopping District is a unique retail shopping
6 Interview with Ren Jie, Vice Manager of the Longfusi
Department Store, June 20, 1992.
area since its retail concentration is not along a major
thoroughfare like Wangfujing (discussed as a mini-case study
below) but is situated along a "back alley" away from normal
vehicular traffic. The pockets of open space along the uneven
east-west spine give the corridor a mysterious but inquisitive
element that encourages shoppers to explore. The mixture of
modern and traditional shops, new and old buildings and
structures of various heights give Longfusi a unique and
eclectic character.
There appears to be a symbiotic relationship within the
district between the 8-story Longfusi Department Store that
anchors the retail area and the small local boutiques, stores
and restaurants that align the narrow corridors of the "T"
axis. Customers who prefer the convenience of shopping in one
store and the wide selection of merchandise purchase goods at
the Longfusi department store. Those who prefer lower prices
(and in some cases, better personal service) buy at the
smaller shops. The increase in traffic and business activity
from both types of customers is mutually advantageous for
both, thereby creating value-added for the whole site.
Another symbiotic relationship exists between the day and
night markets. The brisk daytime business in this area is
complemented by the vibrant night market which carries a
different life of its own. There are portable food stands on
the west side of the horizontal corridor, clothing stands
along the north-south stem of the "T" axis and three theaters
and a karaoke bar along the eastern spine. With the night
market, this shopping district has overlapping time zones
which make the site appear to be open for business even when
many of the daytime shops are closed. The uniqueness of
Longfusi therefore offers an unusual retail real estate
development opportunity.
Development Issues
This redevelopment suffers from three major problems. First,
the commercial area is encumbered with the responsibility of
having to provide major utility, sewage and service lines to
the adjacent streets and throughout the neighboring
residential courtyard area. This burden is in addition to
providing the required infrastructure for the commercial site.
Unless the housing redevelopment is self-sustaining, the
retail area must be developed with sufficient density to
support the site improvements in the adjacent areas and to
fund expected losses from housing relocation. This increase
in density may destroy the fabric which has given Longfusi its
unique charm and popularity.
Secondly, financing the development project will require a
structured joint venture scheme with the local municipality as
one partner because the Longfusi department store is
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government-owned and operated. This is a difficult
partnership for a prospective joint venture partner since the
government, which controls the site, wants to preserve the
integrity of the existing small shops. This restriction
provides an additional constraint that may render the project
unprofitable, especially in light of the increased density
requirements as discussed above.
Finally, the shortage of energy is a general issue which
exacerbates Longfusi's infrastructure deficiencies. Although
the energy problem is not confined only to this site,
developers must realize that their desire to recapture
enormous construction costs will be constrained by shorter
night market hours and a more limited selection of retail
uses.
Retail Joint Venture Options
A joint venture partner consisting of a consortium of the
current small shop owners will not have the financial
wherewithal to carry the whole project through its completion.
In addition, "piecemeal" redevelopment of the district with
numerous small joint ventures between the government and
individual tenants is not recommended since (1) constructing
infrastructure improvements will not be cost effective
overall, (2) the best areas will be developed first at a
profit while the least desirable sections will be developed
later at a loss (theory of "adverse selection") and (3) the
character of the retail site may ultimately result in
development which is motley and contrary to the government's
original intentions.
The government may be forced to concede its desire to maintain
the current programming and the character of the Longfusi area
to attract joint venture capital, especially foreign funding.
In addition, to make the project financially viable, the "deep
pockets" partner(s) should be responsible for funding needed
infrastructure in the commercial section of the site only,
with additional capital for limited adjacent road and utility
improvements. The housing infrastructure requirements should
be kept as a separate matter, with redevelopment of the
commercial site providing some linkage money to fund such
improvements. Future special tax assessments from the
existing retail tenants and the neighboring business community
should provide supplemental funds for the housing
redevelopment efforts.
If the housing component is tied to the commercial
redevelopment, then the retail density must increase and the
programming altered to a level which will make the project
financially attractive to an investor. Whether this can be
successfully accomplished without destroying the fabric of the
district is still an unanswered question. Much economic and
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social data needs to be compiled and analyzed to make this
determination.
WANGFUJING SHOPPING DISTRICT
Location
The Wangfujing Shopping District, called the "Window to the
Capital", runs along a north/south corridor in the Dongcheng
District and is approximately 1,600 meters in length. Its
location is roughly 800 meters east of the Forbidden City and
Tian'anmen Square and is bounded in the north end by Dongsi
Xidaj and bordered in the south end by Xichang'an Jie/
Jianguomen Dajie, the major east-west boulevard in Beijing.
Wangfujing is unique to other comparable shopping districts in
the city since it is situated near expensive international
hotels such as the Beijing Hotel, Palace Hotel, Taiwan Beijing
Hotel and Peace Hotel. This area is almost exclusively retail
in nature, with limited office space on multi-levels (other
than first floor) which service the commercial establishments.
Target Customers
This shopping district caters to both tourists and local
residents and attracts a phenomenal 300,000 to 600,000
visitors daily.69  Tourists are able to enjoy a wide
69 Pei Jianfeng, "A clean sweep of busy Wangfujing", China
Daily, (Beijing), July 14, 1992, p. 6.
99
selection of familiar retail shops, fast food outlets and
franchise clothing stores. Well-known establishments include:
Carl's Jr, Kentucky Fried Chicken (two stores), Dairy Queen,
McDonald's (the only store in China), Seiko (watch store),
Bennetton's (upscale shop for young urban professionals) and
Stefanel (French clothing boutique).
This shopping district is also a favorite for residents in the
community. It is versatile to accommodate those upscale
shoppers who enjoy purchasing goods at international boutiques
and those who desire inexpensive local goods at The Number One
Department Store, one of China's most prosperous retail
establishments. There are characteristics of other local
shopping districts such as small clothing boutiques and
booths. Unlike other commercial areas observed, this had an
automatic teller machine that serves the local residents (but
may also serve foreigners who are registered with
international cash debit systems).
Current State of the Site
On June 26, 1992, a Beijing urban real estate developer
(consisting of two Beijing companies) signed a letter of
intent with the Hong Kong-based Kerry Trading Co Ltd.
(comprised of billionaire Li-Kai Shing and hotel developer
Robert Kuok) to jointly redevelop the Wangfujing Shopping
District. Their intentions for this 3.37 hectare area will be
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to develop it into a world-class shopping location. Land
leases on this site were purchased but for an undisclosed
amount. 70
Evaluation from Foreign Developer's Standpoint
Site Analysis
Its proximity to famous icons and hotels as well as its
variety of local and international establishments makes
Wangfujing the best known and busiest commercial area in
Beijing and a perfect site for retail development.
Additionally, the positive features of this district include
(1) wide streets along the main corridor, which has sufficient
space to accommodate four lanes of traffic (or a double-lane
in each direction), (2) limited vehicular access, which
provides a measure of safety for the heavy pedestrian traffic
circulating in the area, (3) narrow but sufficient space along
smaller side streets to accomodate one lane of traffic and
pedestrian walkways and (4) rows of shady trees, which enhance
the enjoyment of shopping as well as provide a measure of
relief from heat and other weather conditions.
No market information or economic analysis was available to
review but the existence of well-known stores such as
70 Liang Chao, "Overseas companies sign more land leases",
China Daily, (Beijing), June 29, 1992, p. 1.
101
McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken proves that the
prospects for business in the area have been evaluated and
were considered satisfactory.
However, according to conversations with local residents, one
major drawback of the district is that certain Chinese goods
that are usually found in other small community shopping areas
are not carried in any of the Wangfujing stores.
Development Issues
This district has two specific problems: (1) Building
setbacks and (2) Parking. Building setbacks represent a
constant struggle between the local government and the retail
tenants. The government wants deeper setbacks to accommodate
the heavy pedestrian traffic the area constantly endures.
Retail tenants do not like setbacks since they limit street
visibility, signage and ultimately their economic well-being.
The site currently has various setbacks for each building,
resulting in unique but awkward architecture and creating
bottlenecks in the pedestrian flow. This problem presently
does not have a satisfactory solution. It is hoped that this
issue will be addressed in the current redevelopment scheme.
Parking may ostensibly appear to be an unimportant issue given
the heavy reliance on the public transportation system and the
prevailing use of bicycles. However, the experience of the
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You Yi Shopping City-Beijing Lufthansa Center proves that
automobile parking can become a major issue if not adequately
planned. To illustrate potential problems, in the Lufthansa
example the mixed-use development provided for only temporary
zones near the hotel entrance and no long-term parking for the
shopping area. Despite the fact that only .25% of the people
in Beijing own automobiles, 71 it appears that much of that
percentage shop at the Lufthansa Center. The Center needs
space for 500 cars based on preliminary estimates. 72 It is
the present thought than some underground parking will be
considered but this is very expensive and cumbersome since the
retail store is in full operation. In addition, bicycle
considerations were completely ignored. Bicycle parking
should have been addressed given the Center's proximate
location to the Third Ring Road and possible site as a future
subway station.
In the Wangfujing District, two vehicular garages were
originally planned on adjacent streets and scheduled for
construction in 1990. For unknown reasons they were never
built. Speculation was that in the stratification of
important developments for the Government to finance, this
project was not considered a priority and financing was
71 Lecture by urban planning consultant Walter Bor, July 7,
1992.
72 Interview with Ms. Li Hang Nan, Lufthansa Development
Project, July 12, 1992.
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therefore never arranged.
Currently, the potential ' parking problem has yet to
materialize. However, as the redevelopment progresses in the
next few years and as more international and tourist shops are
added to the district's programming, the type of customer in
the Wangfujing area will likely change and the more upscale
shopper with an automobile will have to be accommodated.
Foreign Business Arrangement Options
The Wanfujing Shopping District is considered to be a retail
real estate developer's dream project. It has the advantage
and flexibility of adapting to any entity proposed because of
its ideal location, critical mass and financial potential.
The key decision on the type of foreign business arrangement
to use depends primarily on price and negotiated concessions,
which will be based on the relative bargaining power between
the local government and the developer.
The land lease rights of this prized retail site were sold
only to developers with financial wealth and power, as
evidenced by the recent redevelopment contract signed by the
Hong Kong team of billionaire Li-Kai Shing and Robert Kuok and
the two Beijing companies. The type of foreign business
entity chosen is not known but it is believed that an equity
joint venture is the probable arrangement.
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V. CONCLUSION
The current trends in China provide a favorable investment
climate for prospective investors. Led by Deng Xiaopeng's
assertive move towards economic reform, more barriers to
foreign investment are expected to be removed and the
modernization and economic gains are likely to accelerate in
the future. Although its stated political stance has remained
the same, the PRC will not be able to separate its existing
economic reforms with its governmental obstinance. As
explained by Hong Kong developer Ronnie Chan, "In communist
countries, economic decisions are made to serve the political
party... but economic development will lead to political
openness".
The demographic patterns in Beijing are beneficial to retail
real estate developers. The local economy is well-balanced,
individual prosperity is increasing and the growth in tertiary
industries will require the services of additional commercial
establishments.
Retail developers in China should be aware that they will
likely become long term investors in the construction and
operational aspects of their projects unless they can sell
their interests. Additionally, if their project is large in
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scale, they should expect to be in a joint venture with the
local municipality since the government usually provides the
anchor tenant. It is extremely difficult to secure occupancy
from a large domestic private retailer or a foreign commercial
franchise which does not fall within import restrictions and
import taxes.
Foreign retail developers will tend to seek large projects
because of scaled economies and for added bargaining power
with the local government. Chinese retail developers with a
more limited financial capacity will build smaller projects
which are predominantly build-to-suit space for their own
operations.
The Beijing municipality must improve its urban planning
process if it expects to efficiently create a rational system
of retail development. For example, city planning maps should
be coordinated with underground subway and at-grade
transportation networks. The capabilities of the planning
department should also be upgraded. In sum, if this process
is not adequately planned, Beijing will become a less
effective city and retail developers will either suffer losses
or be left with less than ideal locations. All parties stand
to lose if the urban planning issues discussed in this thesis
are not solved.
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Despite the above limitations, there are opportunities in
Beijing for retail real estate developers to exploit. The
nature of these prospects heavily depends on the financial
capacity of the developer. The city is currently in need of
new or improved infrastructure for most if not all of its
projects. Therefore, a capable builder with nominal funds
will have little negotiating clout in site selection and in
the bureaucratic approval process. "Guanxi" will help to a
large extent, especially if a Chinese joint venture partner is
selected. However, substantial capital will allow developers
to quickly and efficiently capitalize on the best
opportunities in Beijing since it will allow them to:
1) Negotiate the best terms with the government. The power
in bargaining shifts towards the party with financial
strength. As illustrated by the successful Wangfujing
site, only a billionaire developer was able to negotiate
a successful deal with the affluent district government.
Since the government often plays three roles in the
retail real estate development process (regulatory
agency, joint venture development partner and anchor
tenant), greater negotiation power will lead to a
"package" of benefits: quicker approvals, better joint
venture terms and efficient procurement of an anchor
tenant.
107
2) Choose the prime locations in the city for development.
These sites are on the existing and projected subway
routes, along major transportation corridors and directly
in the paths of commercial growth and residential
migration. As discussed in this thesis, the Master Plan
for Beijing is very flexible, with the broad
"Working/Residential" classification as the primarily
category for these ideal retail locations. Presently,
the best short term locations for development are between
the Second and Third Ring Roads and in the non-rural
eastern and western sections of the city. Long term
prospects are situated in the northern and southern
Beijing areas.
3) Purchase domestic raw materials in large bulk and at
favorable prices. This will reduce the dependency on
imported unrefined goods which are more expensive because
of shipping costs and import taxes. Total construction
costs will therefore be lower.
There are a number of risks associated with developing retail
real estate in Beijing. The biggest issue is sovereign risk.
The current reform movement is gaining momentum and is
unlikely to slow in the next few years. However, Deng
Xiaopeng's advancing age is a lingering concern and the
present political hard-liners are still resisting his push for
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accelerated economic growth. There is probably little that
developers can do to protect themselves against the potential
nationalization of retail projects other than to demand higher
rates of return and to remain as active and vital partners in
any joint venture established with the government.
Another significant risk is foreign exchange risk. This
hinders profit repatriation for foreign developers since
domestically earned profits must remain within the country's
borders. The best method to circumvent this problem is to
structure the joint venture with the local government on terms
that require payments to the foreign partner in exchangeable
currency, as illustrated by the Lufthansa Center partnership.
Using swap centers to provide liquidity are also a viable
alternative although transaction fees are assessed.
A third danger is financial construction risk. The inner city
core offers a number of tempting development and redevelopment
possibilities. But these "pockets" are tightly-controlled by
local governments which may require new site improvements,
linkages, and existing buildings to be conserved. These
"hidden" costs can easily render any development project
infeasible, as discussed in the Longfusi example. Development
in rural areas that preempts growth and migration patterns is
also an inviting opportunity since these locations have fewer
restrictions (e.g. height) than the center city and less
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competition. However, these sites probably do not have
existing service infrastructure if they are remote from
current development boundaries. In addition,
telecommunications, sewage and utility lines may not be
available in certain rural areas of Beijing.
The problem of recovering high construction costs is further
compounded by curtailed retail business hours due to the
existing energy shortage and regulatory matters such as water
pollution and urban afforestation laws. Developers should
therefore use their bargaining power to negotiate at minimum
some local government assistance for the above costs. If this
is not available, affluent rural farmers or their factories
benefiting from the site infrastructure should be requested to
share in the costs.
The final issue is operational risk. Retail projects may be
completed and fully functional but they must be monitored for
efficiency. This may be a problem since workers are usually
government employees who do not receive incentive pay.
Furthermore, maintenance and sanitary procedures are generally
deficient although in newer Beijing commercial developments
this problem has been uneven.
Beijing offers excellent retail real estate development
opportunities to both foreign and domestic investors. But
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like all major cities throughout the world, each location is
unique and prospective sites should be individually evaluated
based on their own merits and analyzed using a cost/benefit
approach. A solid work ethic, a knowledge of the local
procedures, an understanding of local conventions and laws and
an ability to predict future demographic trends are all
essential to assure success in such developments.
This thesis is intended to provide a basic framework for
determining the real estate development prospects for
commercial retail uses in Beijing. Further research is
necessary to identify specific sites within the city to
pursue.
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VI. EXHIBITS
EXHIBITS
A: Comparative Beijing Social Labor Force Statistics
B: Beijing City Map
C: Beijing Master Plan for the Year 2000
D: Diagram of Real Estate Development Process in
Beijing
E: Standard Joint Venture Contract
F: Illustration of Beijing Lufthansa Center Partners
G: Summary of Lufthansa Joint Venture Structure
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Beijing Demographic Analysis
Two-Year Analysis of Social Labor Force by Industry (in 000's)
Comparison of Beijing with National Totals and Province-Status Municipalities
Exhibit A
(1) (2) - (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sources:
1991 and 1990 China
Statistical Yearbooks
1990 National Total
1990 % of Total
1989 National Total
1989 % of Total
Total Annual % Change
1990 Beijing Total
1990 % of Total
1989 Beijing Total
1989 % of Total
Farming,
Forestry,
Animal
Husbandry,
Fishery,
and Water
Conservancy Industry
341,770 96,970
60.23% 17.09%
332,834 95,677
60.16% 17.29%
2.68%
907
14.05%
1.35%
2,141
33.17%
910 2,079
14.91% 34.07%
Geological
Survey and
Prospecting Construction
1,000
0.18%
Transport.,
Postal and
Telecommun.,
Services
24,610 14,690
4.34% 2.59
1,042 24,437
0.19% 4.42%
14,322
2.59%
Commerce,
Food Servce,
Mat't Supply
and Marketng
and Storage
29,370
5.18
28,607
5.17
Real Estate
Management,
Public Srvs,
Resident. and
Consultancy
Services
6,370
1.12%
5,913
1.07%
-4.03% 0.71% 2.57% 2.67% 7.73%
6 669 253 684 371
0.09% 10.36% 3.92% 10.60% 5.75%
7 577
0.11% 9.46%
243
3.98%
596
9.77%
316
5.18%
Total Annual % Change -0.33% 2.98% -14.29% 15.94% 4.12%
1990 Shanghai Total 897 3,993 5 338 337
1990 % of Total 11.74% 52.28% 0.07% 4.43% 4.41%
14.77% 17.41%
664 356
8.69% 4.66%
1989 Shanghai Total
1989 % of Total
908 3,975
11.92% 52.20%
Total Annual % Change -1.21% 0.45% 25.00% 0.00% -2.03% 0.61% 2.01%
1990 Tianjin Total 936 1987 37 296 210 424 135
1990 % of Total 20.33% 43.15% 0.80% 6.43% 4.56% 9.21% 2.93%
1989 Tianjin Total
1989 % of Total
934 1968
20.29% 42.75%
Total Annual % Change 0.21% 0.97% 2.78% -5.43% 4.48% -0.24% -0.74%
Note: The largest disparities are in the Farming and Industry sectors, where Beijing and the two municipalities
are less reliant on Farming and more conitted to the Industry, Commerce, Real Estate Management, Education
and Scientific Research sectors. Beijing has devoted a greater percentage of its economic efforts on the
Construction, Education, Scientific Research and in the Government Party Agencies areas than either Shanghai
or Tianjin. These greater ratios are not unexpected since Beijing is undergoing much new construction, is
the Chinese center for higher (earning (Beijing University and Tsinghua University), a leader in computer
technology (Haidian District) and the nerve center of all political decisions.
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4
0.05%
338
4.44%
344
4.52%
660
8.67%
349
4.58%
36
0.78%
313
6.80%
201
4.37%
425
9.23%
136
2.95%
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Sources:
1991 and 1990 China
Statistical Yearbooks
Health Care,
Sports and
Social
Welfare
Education,
Culture and
Art, Radio
and TV
Broadcasting
Scientific
Research and
Polytechnical
Services
Banking and
Insurance
Government
Party
Agencies and
Social
Organizations Others
1990 National Total
1990 % of Total
1989 National Total
1989 % of Total
5,360
0.94%
5,173
0.93%
14,580
2.57%
14,267
2.58%
1,730
0.30%
1,654
0.30%
2,180 10,790
0.38% 1.90%
2,057
0.37%
10,220
1.85%
17,980 567,400
3.17% 100.00%
17,090 553,293
3.09% 100.00%
Total Annual % Change 3.61% 2.19% 4.59%
1990 Beijing Total 139 417 262
1990 % of Total 2.15% 6.46% 4.06%
1989 Beijing Total
1989 % of Total
128
2.10%
395
6.47%
244
4.00%
5.98%
43
0.67%
39
0.64%
5.58%
358
5.55%
347
5.69%
5.21% 2.55%
205 6,455
3.18% 100.00%
221 6,102
3.62% 100.00%
Total Annual % Change 8.59% 5.57%
1990 Shanghai Total 159 343
1990 % of Total 2.08% 4.49%
7.38% 10.26%
118 36
1.54% 0.47%
3.17% -7.24% 5.78%
168 224 7,638
2.20% 2.93% 100.00%
1989 Shanghai Total
1989 % of Total
162
2.13%
343
4.50%
116
1.52%
34
0.45%
165
2.17%
217 7,615
2.85% 100.00%
Total Annual % Change -1.85% 0.00% 1.72% 5.88% 1.82% 3.23% 0.30%
1990 Tianjin Total 83 210 44 26 139 78 4,605
1990 % of Total 1.80% 4.56% 0.96% 0.56% 3.02% 1.69% 100.00%
1989 Tianjin Total
1989 % of Total
83
1.80%
221
4.80%
44
0.96%
24
0.52%
136
2.95%
82 4,603
1.78% 100.00%
Total Annual % Change 0.00% -4.98% 0.00% 8.33% 2.21% -4.88% 0.04%
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Submits application containing market
-study, economic analysis, design &
financing schemas and site requested
Central Governennt:
Involved in process
only if there is Economic
government industry, - - - -- - Planning - - - "
tax revenue metters, Comaittee;
and water and
environmental issues
L _Process continues if aproved and
I developer agrees on site selection
Reviewed by nearly 50
departments to ascertain __ _ Local Government
regulatory domain Organizations
Once approved, anchor tenant is secured
. and detailed drawings required which are
within government guidelines
Central Government:
Involved only if
jurisdictionat - - - -
authority required
Provides Developer:
raw - -Secures permits
materials & raw msterials
Private Inspectors:
Joint venture and Cor
major tenant
If compteted and in compliance,
Certificate of Occupency issued
Completed
Project
Tenants responsible for fit-outs and
operating expenses (net lease structure)
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Locat- Government:
Participates in alt matters, with
subjugated authority in those with
Centrat Governiment jurisdiction
Local Gverrent:
- Involved in alt matters, with
sljugated authority in those with
Central Goverrnment jurisdiction
Locat Bureaus:
- Check for compliance with permits,
design and building guidelines,
and heetth and safety codes
-
EXHIBIT E
SAMPLE CONTRACT FOR
JOINT VENTURES USING
CHINESE AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
Sample Contract*
Chapter 1 General Provisions
In accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment" and other relevant Chinese laws and regulations,
Company and _ Company, adhering to the principle of equality and mutual
benefit and through friendly consultations, agree to jointly invest to set up a joint venture
enterprise in the People's Republic of China. The contract hereunder is worked
out.
Chapter 2 Parties of the Joint Venture
Article 1
Parties of this contract are as follows: Company (hereinafter referred to as Party
A), registered with in China, and its legal address is at (street)
(district) (city) China.
Legal representative: Name:
Position:
Nationality:
- This "Sample Contract for Joint Ventures Using chinese and Foreign Investment" was drafted by the Laws &
Regulations Bureau of the Afinistrv of Foreign Economit Relations and Trade to serve as guidelinesfor enterprises.
A revtew of this draft contract is iworth while as it will give the reader the opportunity to understand the basis which
his counterparts are probably using in their discussions. A "Sample Set of A rticles of Association for Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Fore~tn Investient ", which is not reproduced here is also available.
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Company (hereinafter referred to as Party B), registered with . Its
legal address at
Legal representative: Name:
Position:
Nationality:
(Note : In case there are more than two investors, they will be called Party C, D... in
proper order.)
Chapter 3 Establislinent of the Joint Venture Company
Article 2
In accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investmcnt" and other relevant Chinese laws and regulations, both
parties of the joint venture agree to set up joint venture limited liability company
(hereinafter referred to as the joint venture company).
Article 3
The name of the joint venture company is Limited Liability Company.
The name in foreign language is
The legal address of the joint venture company is at street (city)
province.
Article 4
All activities of the joint venture company shall be governed by the laws, decrees and
pertinent rules and regulations of the People's Republic of China.
Article 5
The organization form of the joint venture company is a limited liability company. Each
party to the joint venture company is liable to the joint venture company within the limit
of the capital subscribed by it. The profits, risks and losses of the joint venture company
shall be shared by the parties in proportion to their contributions of the registered capital.
Chapter 4 The Purpose, Scope and Scale of Production and
Business
Article 6
The purpose of the parties to the joint venture is in conformity with the wish of
enhancing the economic corporation and technical exchanges, to improve the product
quality, develop new products, and gain competitive position in the world market in
quality and price by adopting advanced and appropriate technology and scientific
management methods; so as to raise economic results and ensure satisfactory economic
benefits for each investor.
(Note: This article shall be written according to the specific situations in the contract)
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Article 7
The productive and business scope of the joint venture company is to produce
products; provide maintenance service after the sale of the products; study-and develop
new products.
(Note: It shall be written in the contract according to the specific conditions)
Article 8
The production scales of the joint venture company are as follows:
1. The production capacity after the joint venture put into operation is .
2. The production scale may be increased up to - with the development of
the production and operation. The product varieties may be developed into
(Note: It shall be written according to the specific situation.)
Chapter 5 Total Amount of Investment and the Registered
Capital
Article 9
The total amount of investment of the joint venture company is Rmb (or a
foreign currency agreed upon by both parties.)
A rticle 10
Investment contributed by the parties is Renminbi , which will be the registered
capital of the joint venture company.
Of which: Party A shall pay Yuan, accounts for __%; Party B shall pay
Yuan, accounts for _ o.
Article 11
Both Party A and Party B will contribute the following as their investment:
Party A: cash - Yuan
machines and equipment Yuan
premises Yuan
the right to the use of the site - Yuan
industrial property - Yuan
others - Yuan, - Yuan in all.
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Party B: cash - Yuan
machines and equipmcnt - Yuan
industrial property - Yuan
other - Yuan, - Yuan in all.
(Note: When contributing capital goods or industrial property as investment, Party A and
Party B shall conclude a separate contract to be a part of this main contract.)
Article 12
The registered capital of the joint venture company shall be paid in installments
by Party A and Party B according to their respective proportion of their investment.
Each installment shall be as follows:
(Note: it shall be written according to the concrete conditions.)
Article 13
In case any party to the joint venture intends to assign all or part of his investment
subscribed to a third party, consent shall be obtained from the other party to the joint
venture, and approval from the examination and approval authority is required.
When one party to the joint venture assigns all or part of his investment, the other party
has preemptive right.
Chapter 6 Responsibilities of Each Party to the Joint Venture
Article 14
Party A and Party B shall be respectively responsible for the following matters:
Responsibilities of Party A:
Handling of applications for approval, registration, business license and other matters
concerning the establishment of the joint venture company from relevant departments in
charge of China;
Processing for applying the right to the use of a site to the authority in charge of the
land;
Organizing the design and construction of the premises and other engineering facilities of
the joint venture company;
Providing cash, machinery and equipment and premises ..... in accordance with the
stipulations in Article 11;
Assisting Party B for processing import customs declaration for the machinery and
equipment contributed by Party B as investment and arranging the transportation within
the Chinese territory;
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Assisting the joint venture compny in purchasing or leasing equipment, materials, raw
materials, articles for office use, means of transportation and communication facilities
etc;
Assisting the joint venture company in contacting and settling the fundamental facilities
such as water, electricity, transportation etc.;
Assisting the joint venture in recruiting Chinese management personnel, technical
personnel, workers and other personnel needed;
Assisting foreign workers and staff in applying for the entry visa, work license and
processing their travelling natters;
Responsible for handling other matters entrusted by the joint venture company.
Responsibilities of Party B:
Providing cash, machinery and equipment, industrial property . in accordance with the
stipulations in Article I I, and responsible for shipping capital goods such as machinery
and equipment etc contributed as investment to a Chinese port;
Handling the matters entrusted by the joint venture company, such as selecting and
purchasing machinery and equipment outside China, etc;
Providing needed technical personnel for installing, testing and trial production of the
equipment as well as the technical personnel for production and inspecting;
Training the technical personnel and workers of the joint venture company;
In case Party B is the licensor, it shall be responsible for the stable production of
qualified products of the joint venture company in the light of design capacity within the
stipulated period;
Responsible for other matters entrusted by the joint venture company.
(Note: It shall be written according to the specific situation.)
Chapter 7 Transfer of Technology
Article 15
Both Party A and Party B agree that a technology transfer agreement shall be signed
between the joint venture company and the party B (or a third party) so as to obtain
advanced production technology needed for realizing the production and operation
purpose and the production scale stipulated in Chapter 4 in the contract, including
products designing, technology of manufacturing, means of testing, materials
prescription, standard of quality and the training of personnel etc.
(Note: It shall be written in the contract according to the concrete conditions.)
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Article 16
Party B offers the following guarantees on the transfer of technology:
(Note: article applies only when Party 11 is responsible for transferring technology to the
joint venture company.)
1. Party B guarantees that the overall technology such as the designing,
technology of manufacturing, technological process, tests and inspection of
products (Note: The name of the products shall be written) provided to the
joint venture company must be integrated, precise and reliable. It is to meet
the requirement of the joint venture's opcration purpose, and be able to
obtain the standard of production quality and production capacity stipulated
in the contract;
2. Party B guarantees that the technology stipulated in this contract and the
technology transfer agreement shall be fully transferred to the joint venture
company, and pledges that the provided technology should be truly advanced
among the same type of technology of Party B, the model, specification and
quality of the equipment are excellent and it is to meet the requirement of
technological operation and practical usage;
3. Party B shall work out detailed list of the provided technology and
technological service at various stages as stipulated in the technology transfer
agreement to be an appendix to the contract, and guarantee its performance;
4. The drawings, technological conditions and other detailed information arc
part of the transferred technology and shall be offered on time;
5. Within the validity period of the technology transfer agreement, Party B shall
provide the joint venture company with the improvement of the technology
and the improved information and technological material in time, and shall
not charge separate fees;
6. Party B shall guarantee that the technological personnel and the workers in
the joint venture company can master all the technology transferred within the
period stipulated in the technology transfer agreement.
Article 17
In case Party B fails to provide equipment and technology in accordance with the
stipulations in this contract and in the technology transfer agreement or in case any
deceiving or concealing actions arc found, Party 13 shall be responsible for compensating
the direct losses to the joint venture company.
Article 18
The technology transfer fee shall be paid in royalties. The royalty rate shall be %_
of the net sales value of the products turned out. The term for royalty payment is the
same as the term for technology transfer agreement stipulated in Article 19 of this
contract.
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Article 19
The term for the technology transfer agreement signed by joint venture company and
Party B is years. A fter the expiration of the technology transfer agreement, the
joint venture company shall have the right to use, research and develop the imported
technology continuously.
(Note: The term for a technology transfer agreement is generally no longer than 10 years,
and it shall be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade or
other examination and approval authorities entrusted by the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade.)
Chapter 8 Selling of Products
Article 20
The products of joint venture company will be sold both on Chinese market and on
overseas market, the export part accounts for __o, ___% for domestic market.
(Note: An annual percentage and amount for outside and inside selling will be written out
according to practical situations, in normal conditions, the amount for export shall at
least meet the needs of foreign exchange expenses of the joint venture company.)
Article 21
Products may be sold on overseas market through the following channels:
The joint venture company may directly sell its products on the international market,
which accounts for .__ .
The joint venture company may sign sales contract with Chinese foreign trade companies,
entrusting them to be the sales agencies or exclusive sales agencies, which accounts for
The joint venture company may entrust Party B to sell its products, which accounts for ___%.
Article 22
The joint venture's products to be sold in China may be handled by the Chinese materials
and commercial departments by means of agency or exclusive sales, or may be sold by
joint venture company directly.
Article 23
In order to provide maintenance service to the products sold both in China or abroad,
the joint venture company may set up sales branches for maintenance service both in
China or abroad subject to the approval of the relative Chinese department.
Article 24
The trademark of the joint venture's products is .
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Chapter 9 The Board of Directors
Article 25
The date of registration of the joint venture company shall be the-date of the
establishment of the board of directors of the joint venture company.
Article 26
The board of directors are composed of directors, of which - shall
be appointed by Party A, by Party 1B. The chairman of the board shall be
appointed by Party A, and its vice-chairman by Party B. The term of office for the
directors, chairman and vice-chairman is four years, their term of office may be renewed
if continuously appointed by the relevant party.
Article 27
The highest authority of the joint venture company shall be its board of directors. It shall
decide all major issues (Note: The main contents shall be listed in the light of the Article
36 of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Joint Venture Law) concerning the
joint venture company. Unanimous approval shall be required before any decisions are
made concerning major issues. As for other matters, approval by majority or a simple
majority shall be required.
(Note: It shall be explicitly stipulated in the contract.)
Article 28
The chairman of the board is the legal representative of the joint venture company.
Should the chairman be unable to exercise his responsibilities for some reasons, he shall
authorize the vice-chairman or any other director to represent the joint venture company
temporarily.
Article 29
The board of directors shall convene at least one meeting every year. The meeting shall
be called and presided over by the chairman of the board. The chairman may convene an
interim meeting based on a proposal made by more than one third of the total number of
directors. Minutes of the meetings shall be placed on file.
Chapter 10 Business Management Office
Article 30
The joint venture company shall establish a management office which shall be responsible
for its daily management. The management office shall have a general manager,
appointed by party deputy general managers, by party
by party . The general manager and deputy general managers whose
terms of office are - years shall be appointed by the board of directors.
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A rticle 31
The responsiblity of the general manager is to carry out the decisions of the board
meeting and organize and conduct the daily management of the joint venture company.
The deputy general managers shall assist the general manager in his work.
Several department managers may be appointed by the management office, they shall be
responsible for the works in various departments respectively, handle the matters handed
over by the general manager and deputy general managers and shall be responsible to
them.
Article 32
In case of graft or serious dereliction of duty on the part of the general manager and
deputy general managers, the board of directors shall have the power to dismiss them at
any time.
Chapter 11 Purchase of Equipment
Article 33
In its purchase of required raw materials, fuel, parts, means of transportation and articles
for office use, etc, the joint venture company shall give first priority to purchase in China
where conditions are the same.
Article 34
In case the joint venture company entrusts Party B to purchase equipment on the
overseas market, persons appointed by Party A shall be invited to take part in the
purchasing.
Chapter 12 Preparation and Construction.
Article 35
During the period of preparation and construction, a preparation and construction office
shall be set up under the board of directors. The preparation and construction office shall
consist of_ - persons, among which - persons will be from Party A, - persons
from Party 11. The preparation and construction office shall have one manager
recommended by Party - , and one deputy manager by Party - . The manager and
deputy manager shall be appointed by the board of directors.
Article 36
The preparation and construction office is responsible for the following concrete works:
examining the designs of the project, signing the project construction contract, organizing
the purchasing and inspecting of relative equipment etc, working out the general schedule
of project construction, compiling the expenditure plans, controlling project financial
payments and final accounts of the project, drawing up managerial methods and keeping
and piling documents, drawings, files and materials, etc, during the construction period
of the project.
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Article 37
A technical group with several technical personnel appointed by Party A and Party B
shall be organized. The group, under the leadership of the preparation and construction
office, is in charge of the examination, supervision, inspection, testing, checking and
accepting, and performance checking for the project design, the quality of the project,
the equipment and materials and the imported technology.
Article 38
After approved upon by both parties, the establishment, remuneration and the expenses
of the staff of the preparation and construction office shall be covered in the project
budget.
Article 39
After having completed the project and finishing the turning over procedures, the
preparation and construction offices shall be dissolved upon the approval of the board of
directors.
Chapter 13 Labor Management
Article 40
Labor contract covering the recruitment, employment, dismissal and resignation, wages,
labor insurance, welfare, rewards, penalty and other matters concerning the staff and
workers of the joint venture company shall be drawn up between the joint venture
company and the Trade Union of the joint venture company as a whole, or the individual
employees in the joint venture company as a whole or individual employees in accordance
with the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labor Management in Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment and its Implementation Rules."
Article 41
The appointment of high-ranking administrative personnel recommended by both parties,
their salaries, social insurance, welfare and the standard of travelling expenses, etc shall
be decided by the meeting of the board of directors.
Chapter 14 Taxes, Finance and Audit
Article 42
The joint venture company shall pay taxes in accordance with the stipulations of Chinese
laws and other relative regulations.
Article 43
Staff members and workers and workers of the joint venture company shall pay
individual income tax according to the "Individual Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China."
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Article 44
Allocations for reserve funds, expansion funds of the joint venture company and welfare
funds and bonuses for staff and workers shall be set aside in accordance with the
stipulations in the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Venture Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment". The annual proportion of allocations shall be decided
by the board of directors according to the business situations of the joint venture
company.
Article 45
The fiscal year of the joint venture company shall be from January 1 to December 31.
All vouchers, receipts, statistic statements and reports shall be written in Chinese.
(Note: A foreign language can be used concurrently with mutual consent.)
Article 46
Financial checking and examination of the joint venture company shall be conducted by
an auditor registered in China and reports shall be submitted to the board of directors
and the general manager.
In case Party B considers it is necessary to employ a foreign auditor registered in another
country to undertake annual financial checking and examination, Party A shall give its
consent. All the expenses thereof shall be borne by party B.
Article 47
In the first three months of each fiscal year, the manager shall prepare previous year's
balance sheet, profit and loss statement and proposal regarding the disposal of profits,
and submit them to the board of directors for examination and approval.
Chapter 15 Duration of the Joint Venture
Article 48
The duration of the joint venture company is - years. The establishment of the joint
venture company shall start from the date on which the business license of the joint
venture company is issued.
An application for the extension of the duration, proposed by one party and
unanimously approved by the board of directors, shall be submitted to the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (or the examination and approval authority
entrusted by it) six months prior to the expiry date of the joint venture.
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Chapter 16 The Disposal of Assets After the Expiration of the
Duration
Article 49
Upon the expiration of the duration, or tcrmination before the date of expiration of the
joint venture, liquidation shall be carried out according to the relevant laws. The
liquidated assets shall be distributed in accordance with the proportion of investment
contributed by Party A and party B.
Chapter 17 Insurance
Article 50
Insurance policies of the joint venture company on various kinds of risks shall be
underwritten with the People's Republic of China. Types, the value and duration of
insurance shall be decided by the board of directors in accordance with the stipulations of
the People's Insurance Company of China.
Chapter 18 The Amendment, Alteration and Discharge of the
Contract
Article 51
The amendment of the contract or other appendices shall come into force only after the
written agreement signed by Party A and Party B and approved by the original
examination and approval authority.
Article 52
in case of inability to fulfil the contract or to continue operation due to heavy losses in
successive years as a result of force majcure,the duration of the joint venture and the
contract shall be terminated before the time of expiration after unanimously agreed upon
by the board of directors and approved by the original examination and approval
authority.
Article 53
Should the joint venture company be unable to continue its operations or achieve the
business purpose stipulated in the contract due to the fact that one of the contracting
parties fails to fulfil the obligations prescribed by the contract and articles of association,
or seriously violate the stipulations of the contract and articles of association, that party
shall be deemed as having unilaterally terminated the contract. The other party shall have
the right to terminate the contract in accordance with the provisions of the contract after
approved by the original examination and approval authority as well as to claim
damages. In case Party A and Party B of the joint venture company agree to continue
the operation, the party who fails to fulfil the obligations shall be liable to the economic
losses thus caused to the joint venture company.
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Chapter 19 Liabilities for Breach of Contract
Article 54
Should either Party A or Party B fail to pay on schedule the contributions in accordance
with the provisions defined in Chapter 5 of this contract, the breaching party shall pay to
the other party __._o of the contribution starting from the first month after exceeding
the time limit. Should the breaching party fail to pay after 3 months, _So of the
contribution shall be paid to the other party, who shall have the right to terminate the
contract and to claim damages to the breaching party in accordance with the stipulations
in Article 53 of the contract.
Article 55
Should all or part of the contract and its appendices be unable to be fulfilled owing to
the fault of one party, the breaching party shall bear the responsibilities thus caused.
Should it be the fault of both parties, they shall bear their respective responsibilities
according to actual situations.
Article 56
In order to guarantee the performance of the contract and its appendices, both Party A
and Party B shall provide each other the bank guarantees for the performance of the
contract.
Chapter 20 Force Majeure
Article 57
Should either of the parties to the contract be prevented from executing the contract by
force majeure, such as earthquake, typhoon, flood, fire and war and other unforeseen
events, and their happening and consequences are unpreventable and unavoidable, the
prevented party shall notify the other party by cable without any delay, and within 15
days thereafter provide the detailed information of the events and a valid document for
evidence issued by the relevant public notary organization for explaining the reason of its
inability to execute or delay the execution of all or part of the contract. Both parties
shall, through consultations, decide whether to terminate the contract or to exempt the
part of obligations for implementation of the contract or whether to delay the execution
of the contract according to the effects of the events on the performance of the contract.
Chapter 21 Applicable Law
Article 58
The formation of this contract, its validity, interpretation, execution and settlement of
the disputes shall be governed by the related laws of the People's Republic of China.
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Chapter 22 Settlement of Disputes
Article 59
Any disputes arising from the execution of, or in connection with the contract shall be
settled through friendly consultations between both parties. In case no settlement can be
reached through consultations, the disputes shall be submitted to the Foreign Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade for arbitration in accordance with its rules of procedure. The arbitral
award is final and binding upon both parties.
Or
Any disputes arising from the execution of, or in connection with the contract shall be
settled through friendly consultations between both parties. In case no settlement can be
reached through consultations, the disputes shall be submitted to - Arbitration
Organization in - for arbitration in accordance with its rules of procedure. The
arbitral award is final and binding upon both parties.
Or
Any disputes arising from the execution of, or in connection with the contract shall be
settled through friendly consultations between both parties. In case no settlement can be
settled through consultations, the disputes shall be submitted for arbitration.
Arbitration shall take place in the defendant's country.
If in China, arbitration shall be conducted by the Foreign Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
in accordance with its rules of procedure.
If in - the arbitration shall be conducted by - in accordance with its rules of
procedure.
The arbitral award is final and binding on both parties.
(Note: When formulating contracts, only one of the above-mentioned provisions can be
used.)
Article 60
During the arbitration, the contract shall be observed and enforced by both parties except
for matters in dispute.
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Chapter 23 Language
Article 61
The contract shall be written in Chinese version and in - version. Both languages
are equally authentic. In the event of any discrepancy between the two aforementioned
versions, the Chinese version shall prevail.
Chapter 24 Effectiveness of the Contract and Miscellaneous
Article 62
The appendices drawn up in accordance with the principles of this contract are integral
part of this contract, including: the project agreement, the technology transfer agreement,
the %ales agreement ......
Aricle 63
The contract and its appendices shall come into force beginning from the date of
approval of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the People's
Republic of China (or its entrusted examination and approval authority).
Article 64
Should notices in connection with any party's rights and obligations be sent by either
Party A or Party B by telegram or telex, etc, the written letter notices shall be also
required afterwards. The legal addresses of Party A and Party B listed in this contract
shall be the posting addresses.
Article 65
The contract is signed in , of China by the authorized representatives of both
parties on _ , 19 - .
For Party A For Party B
(Signature) (Signature)
132
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- -
------
BEIJING
ILLUSTRATION OF BEIJING LUFTHANSA CENTER PARTNERS
EQUITY JOINT VENTURE
EXHIBIT F
Be ij ing
Lufthansa
Center Co,
Ltd.
Joint Venture Partner:
Local Government
Joint Venture Partner:
German Partnership
Beijing Municipal --------.------------- ----------------------
Conmnercial Corporation
Note: The You Yi Shopping City/Beijing Lufthansa Center is a Sino-German joint venture consisting of two partners:
the Beijing local government and a German Partnership consisting of 6 conpanies as the majority partner and
a Korean development firm as the minority partner. See Exhibit G for financial structure of this equity
joint venture.
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German Partner: Majority
Deutsche Lufthansa AG
Philipp Holzmann AG
Biltfinger + Berger Bauaktiengesellschaft
Keupinski Hotels S.A.
DEG - Deutsche Investitions- und
EntwicklungsgeseLtschaft mbH
Korean Partner: Minority
Network Development Corporation (BMC)
You Yi Shopping City
Beijing Lufthansa Center
Analysis of Foreign Joint Venture Financial Structure
Exhibit G '
Total Initial Investment in German Marks
Assumed Allocation to Friendship Store (Based on Estimated Square Meters)
Net Investment in Retail Site Only
Assumed Conversion Rate to Yuan (Buy Rate as of July 9, 1992)
Converted Investment in Yuan (Foreign Exchange Certificate)
Annual Lease Payments from Chinese Government
% Gross Sales Clause: 1st 3 Years 0.2%
: Next 27 Years 0.4%
Daily Sales
(in yuan)
1,500,000
1,500,000
Total Estimated Annual Lease Payments
Projected Undiscounted Cash-on-Cash Return Before Taxes
Estimated Payback Period (In Years)
Computed Pretax Internal Rate of Return
Foreign Investment Components:
Total Investment in German Marks
Allocation of Foreign Partner's Investment:
(1) German Co. Majority Partner in German Marks
(2) Korean Co. Minority Partner in S U.S.
Assuned Annt
Payment in FEC
(1st 3 Years)
47,000,000
1,095,000
48,095,000
5.3%
Ex Rate Investment
1.55 S30,000,000
1,000,000,000
25.00%
250,000,000
3.6478
911,950,000
Asstzned AnnI
Payment in FEC
(Next 27 Years)
47,000,000
2,190,000
49,190,000
5.4%
19
3.4%
1,000,000,000
953,500,000
46,500,000
1,000,000,000
Terms of Joint Venture Contract:
(1) 30 year contract with ultimate reversion to the Chinese government at end of term; no nenewal clauses or
options during the term of the contract.
(2) Any excess profits earned from the government department store over the contractual payment to the
foreign joint venture is retained by the Chinese government.
(3) Terms of the joint venture agreement state that foreign partner will absorb total building construction
costs while the Chinese government will prepare the site for construction, some raw materials and labor.
(4) The Korean Partner is a minority partner within the foreign partner's share; the structure of this
arrangement is unknown.
(5) The contract stipulates annual payments to the foreign joint venture partner of 47,000,000 yuan, payable
in Foreign Exchange Certificates (FEC) plus a percentage of gross sales: .2% for the first 3 years and
.4% during the last 27 years. FEC paid to avoid foreign exchange restrictions which do not allow for
profit repatriation.
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